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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RESTITUTION: 1940-1947*

Edward S. Thurstont

I
INTRODUCTION

F

OR some lawyers, perhaps, the term "Restitution," as a title in the
classification of our law, sprang Athena-like from the head of the
American Law Institute, when, in 1937, it published The Restatement
of the Law of Restitution.** Yet the subject matter included under this
title is far from new; it·is simply a grouping together of the common
law Quasi Contract-the "contract implied in law" of an earlier dayand the corresponding right to equitable relief to prevent an unjust enrichment. Although the name may be unfamiliar its importance is indicated by the following statement by Lord Wright.
"[In] ••. the English civil la:w ... there are three principal
categories, contract, tort, and quasi-contract, each of which deals
with a characteristic relation between the parties involved. · In
contract the relationship arises from consent, whether express or
implied in fact; there is an intention to create that relationship.
In tort and quasi-contract there is no intention to create the relationship. It arises by the operation of the law on the facts of the
case. Thus in quasi-contract th~ relation which the law impo!,es
arises from the fact that the defendant has been enriched or advantaged at the expense of the plaintiff under circumstances which

* This

article was originally planned as part of the series for returning veterans.

It cov~rs substantially the field of Restitution (other than that customarily included
under the head of Constructive Trust) except Misrepresentation and Mistake which
will be treated in a later issue of the REVIEW.
Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard University; Professor of Law, Hastings
College of Law, San Francisco; adviser in the preparation of the l;lESTATEMENT OF
REsTITUTION.
** The scope of the RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION is outlined in an article by
the reporters of the Restatement, Professors Seavey and Scott, published in 54 L. Q.
REv. 29 (1938). See also Patterson, "The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrich-.
ment," I Mo. L. REv. 223 (1936).
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make it just that he should make restitution to the plaintiff, so
that it is unjust and a wrong to the plaintiff if he fails to do so.
In tort the defendant has inflicted a wrong on the plaintiff under
such circumstances that justice requires him to pay damages or
make compensation for the wrong." 1
The well-known restitutionary remedies of ejectment, replevin,
action for conversion, and self help, the first of which is usually included under the law of propert,y and the others under torts, as well as
those special doctrines of constructive trusts which are usually discussed
in connection with the law of trusts, are not considered in this paper.
Ames, in his famous article on the "H-istory of Assumpsit" included
in his definition of quasi-contracts, insofar as they were enforceable by
indebitatus assumpsit, not only (a) obligations to pay a sum of money
to prevent an unjust enrichment, but also (b) those "founded •.• upon
a statutory, official or customary duty." 2 Both groups have the common element of being imposed in invito, but the duties in the latter
group do not necessarily involve restitution.11 A common instance of a
statutory duty enforceable by indebitatus assumpsit is the right of a
'public officer to sue to collect his statutory salary.~
For the granting of restitution, whether at law or in equity one
person must have been unjustly enriched or benefittea. at the expense
1
Lord Wright, "The Study of Law," 54 L. Q. REv. 185 at 195 (1938); reprinted in WRIGHT, LEGAL EsSAYS AND ADDRESSES 387 (1939).
2
Z HARv. L. REv. 53 at 64 (1888), reprinted in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 259 (1909), and in AMES, LECTU!'!,ES ON LEGAL HISTORY
-1:z.9 (1913).
8
A statutory duty may, of course, be a duty to make restitution, as in Stride v.
Martin, 184 Md. 446, 41 A. (2d) 489 (1945), where a specific provision of the
Maryland Retail Instalment Sales Act provided for restitution, under certain circumstances c,>f all payments made by a purchaser under such an agreement.
~ Jefferson County v. O'Gara, 239 Ala. 3, 195 S. 277 (1939). See Credit Bureau
v. Johnson, 61; Cal. App. (2d) Supp. 834, 142 P. (2d) 943 (1943) (statutory duty
of one spouse for necessaries furnished the other, Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941)
§ 171]; Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 13 S. (2d) 172 (1943) (statutory liability
imposed on young girl for negligence of person driving with her permission an auto
of which she was the bailee).
Several recent decisions have enlarged this class of duties to include payments
ordered by administrative boards pursuant to statutory authority. National Labor Relations Board v. Killoren, {C.C.A. 8th, 1941) 122-F. (2d) 609, cert. den., 314 U.S.
696, 62 S. Ct. 412 (1941) {back pay allowances). The case is criticized in 55 HARV.
L. REV. 539 (1942), and in several other law journals. In re Shawsheen Dairy, Inc.,
(D.C. Mass. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 494 {a valuable historical opinion by Wyzanski, J.).
5
RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 1 (1937). See Royal Indemnity Company v.
Sol Lustbaden, Inc., (N.Y. City Court, N.Y. Co. 1941) 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 328; Paar
v. City of Prescott, 59 Ariz. 497, 130 P. (2d) 40 (1942).
6
Mergenthaler v. Daily, (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 182 (samples pro-
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of another.~ If there be no enrichment no right of restitution exists.6
If an enrichment is not unjust, restitution is not available, as where a
benefit is officiously conferred,1 or where for any other reason justice
does not require restitution. 8
The flexibility of the remedy of restitution is shown by several late
cases where restitution was granted as being in accordance with justice,
despite a dearth of precedent directly applicable. In Hermann v. Gleason," a 99-year lease of a banking building provided for a readjust. ment of the rent every ten years, the amount to be determined by
referees, if the parties could not agree. On this occasion the referees
did not render their award until after twenty months had elapsed, and
tjiey made no provision for the payment of interest on deferred payments. Reversing a judgment for defendant, the court, in an excellent
opinion by McAllister, J., decided that "Equity and fairness require
that appellants have restitution, by way of interest, on the rentals unpaid during that period. Otherwise, appellee would receive the benefit
of the value of the use of such money, to the disadvantage of appellants, and his retention thereof would result in inequity and unjust
enrichment at their expense." 10
In Schenley Distillers Corporation v. Kinsey Distilling Corporation,11 a company oper.ating a warehouse issued warehouse receipts for
whiskey stored therein at a charge of ten cents per barrel per month.
Tided voluntarily in anticipation of a contract which was never entered into).
· 7 RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 2 (1937). See Saltz Bros., Inc., v. Saltz, infra,
p. 942 and note 3 2.
8
Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority, 17 Wash. (2d) 591, 137
P. (2d) 97 (1943) (plaintiff had contracted away any quasi-contractual right he may have
had to recover for use of plans prepared by him for defendant's use); Bailis v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., (C.C.A. 3d, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 857 (mortgagee refused to
allow plaintiff, purchaser of mortgaged machinery, to remove some of it; held, no
quasi-contractual liability, even though the purchase money paid by plaintiff went to
reduce the mortgage debt); Independent School District v. City of White Bear Lake,
208 Minn. 29, 292 N.W. 777 (1940) (statutory remedy held to be exclusive); Greek
Catholic Congregation of Olyphant v. Plummer, 347 Pa. 351, 32 A. (2d) 299 (1943)
(a questionable application of the doctrine); Hancock v. Village of Hazel Crest, 318
Ill. App. 170, 47 N.E. (2d) 557 (1943) (statutory debt limit of municipal corporation precluded quasi-contractual claim); see also Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.,
Ltd. v. Matlock, 151 Kan. 293, 98 P. (2d) 456 (1940) (statutory remedies must first
be exhausted before bringing suit for reformation or cancellation of policy). Dusenka v.
Dusenka, 221 Minn. 234, 21 N.W. (2d) 528 (1946) (benefit conferred without
expectation of compensaton); Chinnery v. Kennosset Rea1ty Co., 286 N.Y. 167, 36
N.E. (2d) 97 (1941), noted in 27 CoRN. L. Q. 97 (1941) (similar facts).
9
(C.C.A. 6th, 1942) 126 F. (2d) 936.
10
Id. at 940.
11
(C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 350.
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In bankruptcy proceedings the warehouse was sold to defendant "free'
and clear of all claims and liens." Plaintiff, a purchaser of the warehouse receipts for the whiskey stored in the warehouse, tendered storage charges at the ten-cent rate, but the defendant refused to deliver
the whiskey unless it was paid fifteen cents per barrel per month, plus
a handling charge of $ r per barrel, in accordance with a notice given
plaintiff when defend;mt took possession of the warehouse. In an action
to compel delivery of the whiskey, the court, reversing a judgment
below for plaintiff, held that, since there was no contract between
plaintiff and defendant, the defendant not being a party to that contained in the warehouse receipts, "it is clear that plaintiff must be
liable in quasi-contract to prevent unjust enrichment."12
Jn a recent case in Indiana,18 the capital of a saving and loan association having become impaired, the State Department of Financial Institutions .t:iotified its board of directors that unless the impairment was
made up the department, in accordance with its legal authority, would
take over and liquidate the association. The directors thereupon agreed
to make up the requisite amount and subsequently made affidavit that
they had paid this sum to the association. In reliance thereon the Department of Financial Institutions permitted the association to continue
and to receive 'deposits from the public. The affidavit was false and no
money was so paid. In a quasi-contract action brought by the company
against those directors the plaintiff -had judgment. The court referred
to definitions of quasi-contract found in earlier Indiana cases as involving no contract between the parties in question, but "between
whom circumstances have arisen which make it just that one should
have a right and the other should be subject to a liability similar to the
rights and liabilities in certain cases of express contract," and concluded that "under the facts stated ... it cannot be doubted that justice
and equity require that the defendants pay that which they falsely
represented to have been paid by them." u The case seems difficult to
sustain as one involving restitution to prevent an unjust enrichment,
as apparently the court considered it, but perhaps it can be brought
within the analogy of a statutory duty to pay a sum of money, previously referred to in this paper.15
12

Id. at 352.
Clark v. Peoples Savings & Loan Assn. of DeKalb'County, 221 Ind. 168, 46
N.E. (2d) 681 (1943), 144 A.L.R. 1495 at 1498 (1943). .
14
221 Ind. 168 at 172, 46 N.E. (2d) 681 (1943), quoting from State v. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 175 Ind. 59 at 74, 93 N.E. 213 (1910) .
15
•
Supra1 note 2.
18
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II
QuAS1-CoNTRACT D1sTINGUISHED FROM CoNTRACT

Until recently quasi-c01;1ttacts were commonly called "contracts implied in law," with the result that they were not infrequently confused
with true contracts implied in fact, which differ from express contracts
only in that they are inferred wholly or partly from conduct other than
spoken or written words.16
The necessity of distinguishing between true contract and quasicontract is important in many situations. Common instances that come
to mind are those involving transactions with or for the benefit of in-·
£ants and lunatics and at common law, sometimes even today, married
women; 17 as well as where differing clauses of the Statute of Limitations are involved.18 $0 too, where there has been an incomplete performance by plaintiff of a contract followed by a breach thereof or subsequent impossibility, or where the Statute of Frauds is involved, and
sometimes where the contract is illegal, the question whether there is
16
"A 'quasi' or constructive contract is ·an implication of law. An 'implied' contract is an implication of fact. In the former the contract is a mere fiction, imposed in
order to adapt the case to a given remedy. In the latter, the contract is. a fact legitimately inferred. In one, the intention is disregarded; in the other, it is ascertained and
enforced. In one, the duty defines the contract; in the other, the contract defines
the duty." Conkling's Estate v. Champlin, 193 Okla. 79 at 80, 141 P. (2d) 569
(1943), quoting from First Natl. Bank of Okmulgee v. Matlock, 99 Okla. 150, 226
P. 328 (1924).
" ••• Unfortunately, much confusion has resulted from a careless use of terminology and failure to observe a clear distinction between actu~ contracts and quasi contracts. • • • Suffice -it to say that quasi contracts are not contracts at all, for 'neither
promise nor privity, real or imagined, is necessary, .... The quasi contractual obligation
is raised or imposed by law and is independent of any real or expressed intent of the
parties. Tlle obligation is called quasi-contractual because as a matter of legal history
the remedy took the contract form just as if based on an actual contract or agreement•••• Under the theory of a quasi contract, the obligation is de~ned in equity and
good conscience and is imposed by law to prevent unjust enrichment at the expense
of another. See, Restatement, Restitution, § 1." Dusenka v. Dusenka, 221 Minn. 234
at 238, 21 N.W. (2d) 528 (1946). The distinction is also well expressed in American La France Fire Engine Co. v. Borough of Shenandoah, (C.C.A. 3d, 1940) II5 F.
(2d) 866; Johnson v. Natl. Exch. Bank of Wheeling, 124 W. Va. 157, 19 S.E. (2d)
441 (1942); Old Men's Home v. Lee's Estate, 191 Miss. 669, 4 S. (2d) 235 (1941).
17
ln re Ferguson's Guardianship, (Surr. Ct., Westchester Co. 1943) 41 N.Y.S.
(2d) 862, affirmed without opinion, 226 App. Div. 1016, 46 N.Y.S. (2d) 222 (1943)
( one lending money to infant to buy and furnish a house entitled to re\titution of the
property so obtained); General Casmir Pulaski Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Provident Trust
Co. of Philadelphia, 338 Pa. 198, 12 A. (2d) 336 (1940) (purchase money mortgagee
of lunatic, not known to be such, allowed equitable lien on the land); McElroy v. Gay,
155 Fla. 856, 22 S. (2d) 154 (1945) (restitution from infant of land conveyed in
consideration of her fraudulent promise).
18
See Petty & Riddle, Inc. v. Lunt, 104 Utah 130, 138 P. (2d) 648 (1942).
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liability on the contract often may be disregarded and relief had in
quasi-contract for benefits conferred. 19 On the other hand, where a
specific statute rules out a recovery in restitution; an action on the contract may sometimes be available; thus where a sewer assessment
wrongfully levied was not recoverable in quasi-contract for lack of the
"written protest" required by statute, the plaintiff prevailed by showing that the defendant in levying the assessment had violated its contract to abate all sewer assessments on the land in question given in
consideration of the plaintiff's grant to the city of an easement to
construct a sewer on his land.20
. The confusion between contract and quasi-contract still appears to
exist in some quarters. In Costanzo Coal Mining Company v. Weirton
Steel Company 21 the plaintiff sued to recover the difference between
the contract price paid by the defendant for coal sold and delivered to
it by plaintiff and the minimum prices established under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937. The court, after holding that the buyer "was not
protected by the contract but was subjected to the liabilities imposed by
his acceptance of the goods whose price was fixed by the statute," appears to consider this obligation as "a contract implied in fact, . . . one
inferred from the circumstances or acts of the parties.22 It is difficult to
see how this duty, contrary to what the parties had bargained for, can
be called a contractual duty. Rather it is a duty imposed by statute.23
Again, in Meem-/iaskins Coal Corporation v. Pratt,24 upon completion
of a contract for the construction of the stone work of a stone magazine
building it developed that there was a misunderstanding as to the price
to be paid, the contractor believing that he was to receive $1.50 a cubic
foot, the owner that he was to pay $13.50 per cubic yard. The court
ruled that the contractor should recover on a quantum meruit, saying
that "under such circumstances, the law presumes that the defendant
agreed to pay 'the reasonable value of the services"; but oddly enough
continued as follows: "It is a contract implied in fact and differs from
an express contract only in the character of evidence necessary to 19

For discussion of these matters, see infra, pp. 951-967. See also, as to procedure,
King, "The Use of the Common Counts in California," 14 So. CAL. L. REv. 288
1941), which should prove useful to lawyers generally.
20
Kirchnh v. City of Pittsfield, 312 Mass. 342, 44 N.E. (2d) 634 (1942).
21
(C.C.A. 4th, 1945) 150 F. (2d) 929, cert. den., 326 U.S. 765, 66 S. Ct. 147
(1945).
22
Id. at 936.
23
See note 2, supra.
24
299 Ky. 767, 187 S.W. (2d) 435 (1945).

1 947]

RESTITUTION,

1940-1947

94 1

establish it, since "such an obligation, implied as a term of an express contract, becomes a part of the express contract and differs from
an implied obligation imposed by law without regard to the assent of
the party bound." 25

Ili
BENEFITS VOLUNTARILY CONFERRED WITHOUT MISTAKE, CoERCION
OR REQUEST

Like that of the policeman in "The Pirates of Penzance," the
volunteer's lot "is not a happy one." "There are few persons for whom
the common law has so little kindness as for the voluntary intermeddler in other persons' affairs. Not even equity will aid a volunteer, we
are told. A person by unsolicited interference may incur liabilities, but
scarcely obtain rights, as wh~n an intermeddler with the property of
an estate become executor de son tort. In the Roman law it was quite
otherwise. A volunteer, who believed in gooa faith that the interests
of an absent friend were in danger of suffering by neglect, might act
for him." 28
One who has voluntarily conferred a, benefit upon another is, in the
absence of mistake, coercion or request, entitled to restitution only
"where the benefit was conferred under circumstances making such acz:s Id. at 772. See also, Upton on Sovern R.C.D. v. Powell, (Ct. App.) [1942]
1 All Eng. Rep. 220. Defendant's farm was in the Upton police district, but in the
Pershore fire district. Thus he was entitled to the services of the Pershore fire brigade
without charge, but not those of the Upton fire brigade. A fire broke out on his farm
and defendant telephoned the police inspector at Upton asking that the fire brigade
be sent. The inspector naturally summoned the local Upton fire brigade which put
out the fire, all the parties believing that the fire was in the Upton fire district. The
Upton R.C.D. recovered remuneration from defendant on the ground that there was
"an implied in fact'' contract. A note in 6 Mon. L. REv. 157 (1943) calls it
"astonishing'' thus to "imply" a contract not intended by either party.
An English heresy, which happily does not prevail in this country, that there
cannot be a quasi-contract where the parties had purported to enter into a contract
which was ultra vires as to the corporate defendant, was recently reaffirmed by a
New Zealand court, although the plaintiff was given relief by means of a "tracing
order'' or, as we would say, a constructive trust. Tauranga Borough v. Tauranga Electric Power Board, [1944] N.Z.L.R. 155. A note in 60 L. Q. REv. 314 (1944) says
that this is a regrettable decision, since Lord Wright, in his LEGAL EssAYS AND ADDRESSES 16, 32 (1939), and 57 L. Q. REV. 184 (1941), has demolished the dictum
of Lord Haldane in Sinclair v. Brougham, (1914] A.C. 398 at 414, on which the
•instant case relied.
28
The late Professor Hope began his excellent article, entitled "Officiousness,"
15 CoRN. L. Q. 25, 205 (1929, 1930), with this quotation from Professor Radin's
HANDBOOK OF RoMAN LAW 301 (1927).
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·tion necessary for the protection pf the interests of the other or of third
persons." 27
To be sure, the voluntary rendering of services with the knowledge
and approval of the recipient will give rise to an inference of a promise
to pay for them, in the absence of an implication to the contrary,28 but
this is a true contract implied in fact, not a quasi-contract,2° and a contemporaneous mutual intention to contract is requisite to such an implied-in-fact contract.80
Of course a volunteer who performs services, however beneficial,
for one whom he knows to be unwilling to receive them from him is
properly denied restitution, since his conduct is obviously officious.81
Thus in Saltz Brothers, Inc. v. Saltz,32 where, after the pfaintifPs term
of employment as manager of defendant's store having come to an end,
he nevertheless continued to act as manager after having been ordered
to surrender possession and leave the premises, he was not entitled, to
compensation for his -services on principles either of contract or of
quasi-contract, although the services had been beneficial to the d-efendant.
Nevertheless, by the better view, where one, intending to claim
compensation and not acting officiously, preserves another's belongings
from impending harm he should be allowed restitution for the value of
his services and expenditures,88 and certainly one who, without officiousness and expecting to claim compensation, acts in an emergency to
27

RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § II2 (1937). But see Board of Commissioners
of Decatur County v. Greenburg Times, 215 Ind. 471, 19 N.E. (2d) 459, 20 N.E.
(2d) 647 (1939), noted 38 MxcH. L. REv. 422 (1940).
28
In re Superior's Estate, 211 Minn. 108, 300 N. W. 3-93 (1941); Moore v.
Spremo, 72 Cal. App. (2d) 324, 164 P. (2d) 540 (1945) (as between members of the
same family or household the implication is reversed). See In re Limehouse's
Estate, 198 S.C.' l 5, I 6 S.E. ( 2d) l ( I 94 I) ; Eklund v. Eklund, ( Cal. App. 1946) I 73
P. (2d) 50; 20 N. C. L. REv. 205 (1942).
29
See In re Home Protection Bldg. & Loan Assn., 143 Pa. Super. 96, 17 A. (2d)
755 (1941); Wescoatt v. Meeker, 63 Cal. App. (2d) 618, 147 P. (2d) 41 (1944).
,so Chinnery v. Kennossit Realty Co., Inc., 282 N.Y. 167, 36 N.E. (2d) 97
(1941), noted 27 CoRN. L. Q. 97 (1941); In re St. Germain's Estate, 246 Wis. 409,
17 N.W. (2d) 582 (1945); Dusenka v. Dusenka, 221 Minn. 234, 21 N.W. (2d)
528 (1946).
81
"Officiousness means interference in the affairs of others not justified by the
circumstances under which the interference takes place." RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,
§ 2, comment a (1937) •
82
•
(App. D.C. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 79.
88
See the cii'.efully guarded provisions of RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 117
and the annotation to this seqion in the Reporter's Notes (1937).
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preserve another's life or to protect him from serious harm should have
restitution. 34 In Harrington v. Taylor 85 defendant's wife attacked him
with an axe and was about to kill him when plaintiff intervened and
was herself badly cut. Defendant orally promised to pay plaintiff her
damages, but after paying a small sum failed to pay any more. Held,
on demurrer, for defendant, since his promise was without consideration. Quite aside from the defendant's promise, it is doubtful whether
plaintiff could recover for her services, but is it not a rather different
question where the plaintiff seeks compensation for bodily harm suffered and perhaps medical expenses incurred in the course of go'ing to
the rescue of the plaintiff? 86
Other situations where restitution is usually allowed to a volunteer
are those where one furnishes necessaries to a lunatic, a married woman
or a minor child, where the guardian, husband or parent, as the case
may be, is not available or has failed in his duty to furnish such necessaries. 87 Moreover, the infant's contract for necessaries is really quasicontractual, as is shown by the rule that the claim is collectible from the
infant only to the extent that the sum claimed is reasonable.88
,
Reminiscent of a time-honored practice, although today it is usually
provided for by statute, is Ashland County v. Bayfield County,8° where
the plaintiff obtained restitution from the defendant of the value of
relief-i.e., necessaries-furnished a pauper who was an inhabitant of
the defendant coruity.40
The rule that one who voluntarily pays another's debt is denied
restitution from t~e other, whatever be the circumstances, has apparently crystalized in most states. Thus one who pays his friend's club
dues or taxes when the latter is ill or absent, in order to stave off a forfeiture or who pays his deceased brother's doctor bill to accommodate
84

RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § II6 (1937).
225 N.C. 690, 36 S.E. (2d) 227 (1945). See contra, Webb v. McGowin, 232
Ala. 374, 168 S. 199 (1936). Compare 7 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 124 (1939).
86
Perhaps the rule based upon incomplete privilege which charges the person who
quite properly harms another's property for his own or a third person's protection
[RESTITUTIO:,.' RESTATEMENT, § 122 (1937)] furnishes a possible analogy. See 22
CORN. L. Q. 156 (1936).
_
81
RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,§ II3 (1937). See Guthrie v. Bobo, (Ala. 1946)
26 S. (2d) 203. In Churchward v. Churchward, 132 Conn. 72, 42 A. (2d) 659
(1945), a neglected wife who had expended her own funds for the support of herself
and her children was granted restitution from the husband and father.
88
See I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 240 (1936). .
89
246 Wis. 315, 16 N.W. (2d) 809 (1944).
40 See RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § II3, comment b (1937); WooDWARD,
QuASI CoNTRACTS, § 204 (1913). See 19 TENN. L. REv. 365 C1946).
85
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the doctor 41 is without relief, although this payment is usually treated
as a satisfaction of the claim barring a second recovery by the creditor/z
Yet if the payee had known enough law to take from the creditor an
assignment of the claim he could have enforced the payment thereof.
It is submitted that this doctrine which so penalizes the well-intentioned layman is unduly harsh, and that each case should be considered
on its merits. 43 Of course, if plaintiff intended a gift to the debtor and
did not expect reimbursement that is another matter.44

IV
RESTITUTION AGAINST A ToRT-FEASOR

The time-honored doctrine of equity, requiring specific delivery
to the person entitled to the possession of a unique chattel by one who
tortiously withholds it, is an obvious instance of restitution against a
tort-feasor.44 a
More commonly, restitutionary relief against such- a person is had
by the .quasi-contractual action of indebitatus assumpsit, which 'in this
situation is loosely called "waiver of tort"; which simply means that
the claimant has elected to seek a sum of money by way of restitution
rather than damages in a tort action. In this :field it is interesting to
note that the fact situation of one of the earliest recorded cases of quasicontract, if not the :first one, Arris v. Stukely,4 5 is constantly coming
before our courts today, namely, the restitutionary right of a 'de jure
41
McGlew v. McDade, 146 Cal. 553, 80 P. 695 (1905). In Scoville v. Vail Inv.
Co., 55 Ariz. 486, 103 P. (2d) 662 (1940), the court stressed the point that under
the circumstances to enforce restitution from a volunteer would impose a hardship on
defendant.
42
See 2 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 421 · (1932); 6 WILLI~ToN, CoNTRACTS,
rev. ed., §§ 1857-1860 (1938). See also Gold, "Accord and Satisfaction by a
Stranger," 19 CAN. B. REV. 165 (1941).
48
Hope, "Officiousness," 15 CoRN. L. Q. 25, 205 (1929, 1930).
44
Chinnery v. Kennosset Realty Co., Inc., 286 N.Y. 167, 36 N.E. (2d) 97
(1941); Dusenka v. Dusenka, 221 Minn. 234, 21 N.W. (2d) 528 (1946).
,l4a See 1 PoMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed.,§ 185 (1944). The well-known Pusey Horn case, Pusey v. Pusey, l Vern. 273, 23 Eng. Rep. 465 (1684}, and
Duke of Somerset v. Cookson, 3 P. Wms. 390, 24 Eng. Rep. 1II4 (1735), are
typical instances of this doctrine. A recent instance is Taliaferre v. Reirdon, 186 Okla.
603, 99 P. (2d) 522 (1940). Legal title to bank stock belonging to an estate in process
of administration had been wrongfully vested by. the executors in one of their number
in his individual capacity. The court upheld a judgment requiring that title be reinvested in the estate, saying that "the exercise of equitable jurisdiction was essential to full
relief."
45
2 Mod. 260, 86 Eng. Rep. 1060 (1677).
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officer against a de facto officer who has received the farmer's salary.¼6
The difference between the tort action and the quasi-contractual
claim for restitution is emphasized in a Minnesota case 47 where Stone,.
J., pointed out that:
"It is characteristic of fraud inducing a contract that the victim ordinarily has an election of remedies. A contract so induced
is voidable. The victim may affirm and, keeping what he has received, sue at law for what damage he has sustained by reason of
the fraud. Or he may, in equity or by his own act, rescind the
tainted contract and, returning what he has received, recover all
he has parted with under the contract. . . . Where the victim
rescinds, he is entitled to no damages, save in the sense that any
recovery by action at law is loosely termed 'damages.' 48 Rescission abolishes the contract and all its incidents. The only residual
importance of both contract and the tort of inducing ,deceit is as
evidence. What remains is a legally imposed obligation of the
parties, each to the other, to restore the status quo ante. That
obligation is based neither on the contract nor on the tort of deceit.
It is imposed by law to prevent unconscionable enrichment of one
at the expense of another." 49
What is' meant by an enrichment of the defendant in a waiver of
tort case? It is usually held that one who converts the plaintiff's stolen
chattel is thereby enriched, even though he may have paid its full
value when he bought it from a thiee 0 But in Soderlin v. Marquette
46
Walker v. Hughes, 42 Del. 447, 36 A. (2d) 47 (1944), 151 A.L.R. 946 at
952 (1944). In State ex rel. Cox v. Hooper, 137 Ohio St. 222, 28 N.E. (2d) 598
(1940), it was held that where the state has paid a de facto officer without objection
from the de jure officer, the latter cannot recover his salary from the state, but must
resort to his claim against the de facto officer, citing RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 137
(1937). The case is noted in 16 UNiv. CIN. L. REv. 247 (1942); 29 GEo. L. J.
242 (1940).
47
Hatch v. Kulick, 2II Minn. 309, 1 N.W. (2d) 359 (194r).
48
Less happily, the California Supreme Court, on one occasion characterized
restitution upon avoidance of a contract for misrepresentation as "an action for damages." City of Oakland v. California Construction Co., 15 Cal. (2d) 573 at 577, 104
P. (2d) 30 (1940).
49

2II Minn. 309 at 3II and note 2, I N.W. (2d) 359 (1941). Of course,
proof of defendant's tortious conduct is essential to show the injustice of his enrichment. See REsTITUTION RESTATEMENT, introductory note to c. 7 (1937).
GO RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 128, comment f. (1937).
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National Bank of Minneapolis 51 the Supreme Court of Minnesota, a
court distinguished for its excellent quasi-contract decisions, recently
ruled that the defendant bank, which had in good faith cashed upon a
forged indorsement and subsequently collected from the drawee a
check belonging to the plaintiff, could not be sued for money had and
received. The court said: "In the instant case, the bank paid out the
entire proceeds of the check by cash and credit. It received from the
drawee bank only the amount it had disbursed. It was not unjustly
enriched." 52 As an original question there is much to be said for this
conclusion 58 but the current of authority is contra.54
Raven Red Ash Coal Company, Inc. v. Ball 55 is notable for deciding two important points of lavy-. The defendant's predecessors in title
had obtained from plaintiff's predecessor in title the grant of an easement to pass over what is now plaintiff's land from land of the grantee
of the easement for purposes of digging, mining and transporting coal.
- · The grantees subsequently acquired other coal lands and for a number
of years transported across plaintiff's land coal mined in such other
land as well as that mined in the land specified in the grant. Plaintiff now sues defendant for use and occupation to obtain compensation for the use of his land in transporting coal from the above mentioned "other land." Held, the action lies: The court, quoting with
approval the Reporters'· Explanatory Notes to section 129 of the
Restatement of Restitution, declined to follow the majority doctrine,
which it pointed out was the product of ·an historical rule, the reason
for which has largely disappeared, that an action for assumpsit for use
and occupation is not 'available against a trespasser on land. The court
also repudiated the narrow rule of Phillips v. Homfray,5 6 that no restitution can be had for a negative enrichment, favoring the dissenting
opinion of Justice Baggallay in that case, and following Edwards v.
· Lee's Administrator,51 the "Great Onyx Cave Case." The decision re51

214 Minn. 408, 8 N.W. {2d) 331 (1943). The case is critically noted in 27
(1943).

MINN. L. REV. 583
52 Id. at 41 2.
58

_

See Greer v. Newland, 70 Kan. 315, 78 P. 835 (1904), and see WOODWARD,
QUASI CONTRACTS,§ 279 (1913).
5 " See REsTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 128 and comment f, § l 54 and comment
a, and Reporter's Note to§ 128, p. 188 (1937).
55
185 Va. 534, 39 S.E. (2d) 231 (1946).
56
24 Ch. Div. 439 {1883).
57
265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W. 1028 (1936).
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veals a refreshing approach to the two inter-related problems arid is
much to be commended.58
A clear case of positive enrichment is Paar v. City of Prescott 59
where the defendant municipal corporation used plaintiff's private
water supply system and sold the water. Plaintiff was allowed to
recover the sums received. The court pointed out that it would be an
unjust enrichment to allow defendant to retain the $20,000 collected
for the use of plaintiff's property without paying for such use. 60 Similarly, where the assignee of a patent' on a royalty basis after he had
exercised his option to cancel the assignment and had reassigned the
patent, continued to manufacture and sell the patented article, the court
held him liable to pay royalties 'as before, "upon the well-recognized
and settled principle that a person shall not be permitted to enrich
himself unjustly at the expense of another." 61 So also, where a defendant, having wrongfully and illegally obtained possession of certain
designs, drawings and formulae, used them in a successful application
for two patents, the court recognized that the designer was entitled to
have defendant declared a trustee ex maleficio and required to account
for his profits. 62 Profits wrongfully obtained by a fiduciary are recoverable by his beneficiary. Thus where plaintiff's broker to sell took a
secret commission from the buyer, plaintiff was allowed to recover both
commissions in assumpsit. 68
It is not necessary, however, that a defendant shall have acted in
58

See also Olwell v. Nye & Nisson Co., (Wash~ 1946) 173 P. (2d) 652 (assumpsit: owner recovered from unauthorized user of machine reasohable value of use).
Quoting RESTITUTIOi'f RESTATEMENT, § 1, comment b (1937), "A person ••• confers
a benefit not only where he adds to the property of another, but also where he saves
the other from expense or loss." Monarch Refineries, Inc. v. Union Tank Car Co.,
193 Okla. IIO, 141 P. (2d) 556 (1943) (value of unauthorized use determined by
owner's usual charge).
59
59 Ariz. 497, 130 P. (2d) 40 (1942).
0
Citing RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 1 (1937).
61
Seagren v. Smith, 63 Cal. App. (2d) 733, 147 P. (2d) 682 (1944).
62
Eckert v. Braun, (C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 155 F. (2d) 517. However, the action,
which was for a declaratory judgment, was dismissed because the plaintiff had no
standing ip the federal court, since the relief sought was of a general equitable nature
and did not arise under the patent laws of the United States except in a most indirect
manner.
Assumpsit lies to recover the amount of money embezzled by plaintiff's employee
and paid by him to defendant, a "bookmaker," on a gambling debt, since defendant
came by the money unlawfully. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Benevento, 133
N.J.L. 315, 44 A. (2d) 97 (1945).
68
Wechsler v. Bowman, 285 N.Y. 284, 34 N.E. (2d) 322 (1941); 134 A.L.R.
1337 at 1346 (1941).
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bad faith. In King County v. Odman, 64 the defendants, owners of
land, leased it ·for .a term of years. The land .was sold for taxes to
plaintiff, but not until a year later did the defendants and their tenant
learn of the sale. Meantime, the tenant had paid his rent to defendants. In an action to recover this rent the court held for the
plaintiff, pointing out that it was immaterial that the lease was extinguished by the tax sale, that such sale created no new relation of
landlord and tenant, that plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of any
of the provisions of the lease and that there was no privity between
plaintiff and defendants with respect to the moneys so paid to defendants by their tenant. The money was paid for the use of the
property which at the time belonged to plaintiff. Thus, although defendants had received the money under an honest mistake of fact, it
did not belong to them, and since it had been paid for the use of
plaintiff's land plaintiff was entitled to it on principles of quasi-contract. a11
In Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland v. Krout 66 the defendant had drawn his check for $3500 on a bank in which he had a
deposit account. The bank after paying the check was notified by Krout
that his signature was a forgery. Thereupon the bank obtained reimbursement from the plaintiff Fidelity Company which had insured the
bank against loss by forged checks. Held, that the plaintiff Fidelity
Company, having discovered that Krout's signature was not a forgery,
was entitled to restitution from him of the loss occasioned by his fraud,
Krout being "estopped from relying upon the genuineness of his signature to show that the payment was not actually that of a loss within the
coverage of the bond."
On the troublesome matter of election, attention should be called
to United Australia v. Barclays Bank. 61 The plaintiff had brought an
action of assumpsit for money lent against a converter of a check, relying upon the doctrine of "waiver of tort," and had discontinued the action before trial because the claim was discovered to be uncollectible.
Subsequently, the plaintiff brought the present action against a later
converter of the check for conversion or alternately for money had and
8 Wash. (2d) 32, I I I P. (2d) 228 (1941); 133 A.L.R. 1440 at 1443
(1941). See 16 Umv. CIN. L. REV. 247 (1942).
65
The court added that, although the tenant was not liable for the stipulated
rent but only for the reasonable value of the use, that was- the tenant's concern, not defendant's. Defendants could have raised that point by paying the money into court
and interpleading the tenant and the_ plaintiff.
66
(C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 157 F. (2d) 912.
61
[ 1941] A.C. 1.
64
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received. The House of Lords, reversing the judgment below, held
that the first action was no bar to the second one.es This•repudiation of
the narrow view that one who elects to "waive" a tort and sue in assumpsit thereby ccaffirms" or ratifies the transaction and thus condones
the tort, is approved with enthusiasm in an article by Lord Wright,69
who notes that the Lord Chancellor quotes the Restatement of Restitution to the effect that "the election to bring an action of assumpsit
is . . . [merely] the choice of one of two alternative remedies.''7°
When one sues in assumpsit for money had and received to recover
money obtained by defendant's fraud, should the statute of limitations
begin to run at the time the money was obtained, or from the time
when plaintiff discovered the fraud? Cohen v. City of New York 11
held that, since plaintiff's complaint alleged only a quasi-contractual
"debt" or duty to pay money in which any wrong of defendant is incidental, he cannot by bill of particulars setting up his rescission of a
transaction for fraud turn the action into "a cause of action in tort which
thout;h restitutionary is based primarily on alleged wrongdoing by
defendant." It is submitted. that the statutory provision postponing
the running of the statute of limitations until the fraud is or should
have been, discovered ought not to be limited to the action of tort for
deceit. In view of their equitable character, it seems that the statutory
postponement should apply also to quasi-contractual claims based
upon fraud. A recent California decision, which involved facts very
similar to those of the Cohen case, upheld a judgment for the
plaintiff.12
es The trial judge and the court of appeal had relied upon the oft-quoted dictum
of Bovill, C. J., in Smith v. Baker, L.R. 8 C.P. 350 (1873).
69
"United Australia v. Barclays Bank," 57 L. Q. REv. 184 (1941).
70
Introductory note to c. 7, at p. 525 (1937).
As to the distinction between election between alternative rights and election between alternative remedies, see Deinard, "Election of Remedies," 6 MINN. L. REV.
341 (1922).
The rule of Smith v. Baker, L.R. 8 C.P. 350 (1873) supra, note 63, and the
analogous rule of Terry v. Munger, 121 N.Y. 161, 24 N.E. 272 (1890), 8 L.R.A.
216 (1890), have recently been set aside in New York by N.Y. Laws (1939) chs. 126,
127, 128. See ''Election of Remedies," 1939 Report of the New York Law Revision
Comm. 221.
Of course, as in Sheppard v. Blitz, 177 Ore. 501, 163 P. (2d) 519 (1945), an
election to avoid a contract is not conclusive on a plaintiff where his suit to rescind is
denied for non-joinder of necessary parties. Consequently he may thereafter sue in
tort to recover damages for fraud, quoting REsTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 68, comment f (1937). See also 39 M1cH. L. REV. 652 (1941).
71
283 N.Y. u2, 27 N.E. (2d) 803 (1940).
72
Adams v. Harrison, 34 Cal. App. (2d) 288, 93 P. (2d) 237 (1939). An
election, because of fraud, to rescind the purchase of an oil lease and seek recovery of
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On the disputed question as to the assignability of the right to
rescind a conveyance for fraud the recent cases continue th~ old con:flict.1s
Attention should also be called to the New York statute allowing
damages in actions for rescission.14

V
BENEFITS CONFERRED IN THE PERFORMANCE O;F A CONTRACT

A. Upon breach by defendant
Ordinarily "where one party repudiates or breaches a substantial
part of his contract, the other· may choose to rescind and recover in
quasi contract the value of his performance. . • • The theory of recovery
is .p.ot compensation, as in a case of a suit for breach of contract, but
restitution. Plaintiff is to be restored as nearly as possible to hi~ position
before he made the contract, and defendant is not allowed to prevent
this by setting up· in defense a contract which he himself has seen fit to
repudiate or breach}' 75 In this country one usually is allowed rescission and restitution under the same circumstances as would create a
defense to an action brought by the other party for breach of their contract. 76 This, like "waiver of tort," is merely an alternative remedy,
the purchase money paid wasileld in Davidson v. McKown, 157 Kan. 217, 139 P.
(2d) 421 (1943), to release all claim to the property in priority to the rights of subsequent mortgagee which had taken on the property with notice of the pendency of
plaintiff's action.
18
Such an assignment was upheld in American Trust Co. v. California Western
States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. (2d) 42, 98 P. (2d) 497 (1940); Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Benevento, 133 N. J. L. 315, 44 A. (2d) 97 (1945). Contra, Jones
v. Comer, 123 W. Va. 129, 13 S.E. (2d) 578 (1941). See 41 CoL. L. REv. 1428
(1941).
74
N.Y. Civil Practice Act (Cahill, Supp. 1945) § 112 e, as amended, N.Y. Laws
(1941) c. 315. See 1941 Report of the New York Law Revision Comm. 285; 41
CoL. L. REv. 556 (1941); 11 FoRDHAM L. REv. rn6 (1942).
16
Stark v. Magnuson, 212 Minn. 167 at 169, 2 N.W. (2d) 814 (1942). As compensation for caring for his cattle, defendant agreed to give plaintiff a share of the
profits on the sale of the cattle the next fall. On defendant's refusal to sell, plaintiff
recovered the value of his services.)
See also, Givens v. Vaughn-Griffin Packing Co., 146 Fla. 575, I S. (2d) 714
( I 941). Plaintiff contracted to buy and pick within a specified time defendant's
orange crop, paying $2000 in advance. Plaintiff's advanced payment held recoverable
on the ground that defendant by refusing to perform had "rescinded" the contract.
Cannon v. Chadwell, 25 Tenn. App. 42, 150 S.W. (2d) 7IO (1940).
16
2 CoNTRAcTs RESTATEMENT, § 347 (1932); 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev.
ed., § 1467 (1937). See Johnson v. Meirs, (Mont. 1946) 164 P. (2d) IOIZ. For
a criticism of the narrower English doctrine, see 57 L. Q. REV. 373 (1941).
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but it often serves a useful purpose and sometimes is of great value to a
plaintiff, as where damages for non-perf.ormance would be slight, or
even nil, because the thing which defendant was to furnish by way of
performance has depreciated in value or has become valueless.71
Where in performance of his contract a plaintiff has transferred
land, chattels or choses in action, his restitutionary right is usually
limited to an action to recover the value of the things so transferred,
but in a few special situations specific restitution of the property is
available.78 The most common case is where land is conveyed in consideration of an agreement by tp.e grantee to support the grantor for
life, or to support some other person as to whom the grantor has an interest or duty. 79 The reason usually assigned is that a judgment for
damages would be entirely inadequate, although some courts deny
relief, in the absence of fraud, unless the deed contains an express condition of forfeiture,8° in which event the restitution is really a specific
enforcement of a term of the contract.81
Specific restitution is also commonly granted by way of rescission
by the lessor of an oil lease for the lessee's failure to develop the
property.82
B. Upon breach by plaintiff
Where the plaintiff himself is the one who has committed a brea~h
of contract which goes to the essence, since he ordinarily has no relief
by way of action on the contract, his only remedy, if remedy he is to·.
have, must be by way of restitution. Although in the absence of statute
11
See Richard v. Credit Suisse, 242 N.Y. 346, 152 N.E. no (1926) {restitution of sum paid defendant who failed to establish credit in fo!eign currency which
has since depreciated). See also 23 CAL.·L. REv. 313 (1935); 7 So. CAL. L. REv. 338
(1934); 34 CoL. L. REv. 365 (1934); 55 HARV. L. REV. 1226 (1942).
18
2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 354 (1932); 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev.
ed,. §§ 1456, 1458 (1937).
79
Timberman v. Timberman, 229 Iowa 835, 295 N.W. 158 (1940); Barth v.
Titus, 108 Colo. 333, II7 P. (2d) 480 (1941); and see Brinkley v. Patton, 194 Okla.
244, 149 P. (.zd) 261 (1944). See Cornelius v. Walker, 248 Ala. 154, 27 S. (2d) 17
(1946). By statute a conveyance for support is avoidable by the granter at his ele_ction,
save as to bona fide transferee of the grantee. Rescission allowed with compensation to
grantee for expenses incurred by him in performance of their contract.
8
° Conley v. Sharpe, 58 Cal. App. (2d) 145, 136 P. (2d) 376 (1943), criticized
in 32 CAL. L. REv. 191 (1944).
81
.
Other devices used by courts of equity to give relief where there has been a
failure of consideration of a support deed are discussed in 4 PoMERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 2d ed.,§ 2108 (1919). See also 32 MICH. L. REv. 685 (1934).
82
Skelly Oil Co. v. Boles, 193 Okla. 308, 142 P. (2d) 969 (1943); Doss Oil
Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P. (2d) 934 (1943)'! See notes in 6
CAL. L. REv. 309 (1918), 17 CAL. L. REv. 41 (r928).
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an employee in default is usually denied relief, 83 a non-wilful breach
of a building contract by a contractor is ordinarily no bar to an action of
quasi-contract for benefits conferred by an incomplete performance less
the other's damages resulting from the breach,84 and one who has made
a partial performance of a contr~ct to sell goods is given relief on similar terms. 85 On the other hand, a purchaser of land or chattels on a
conditional sale whereby title is not to pass until the purchase price is
fully paid is commonly held to forfeit the entire value of his partial
performance upon his inability to complete performance whatever be
the cause. 86 Contrast the historic solicitude of a court of equity for the
mortgagor in ·default, whose position is little different from that of the
defaulting purchaser, since both are security transactions. The failure
of most of our courts to apply the mortgage analogy to contracts for the
conditional sale of land has worked untold hardship and it is regrettable
to fintl o~e of the few courts which at one time apparently was willing
to afford relief to a defaulting purchaser,87 now denying restitution.88
A more satisfactory result was reached in the somewhat analagous case
of MacMurray v. City of Long Beach. 89 In this connection attention
must be called to Professor Edwin L. Patterson's monograph, "Resti- ·
tution for Benefits Conferred by a Party in Default Under a Contract," prepared for the New Yark Law Revision Commission.00 Another recent case accepting the more equitable minority view is Weissenberger v. Central Acceptance Corporation 91 where plaintiff under an
"income builder" contract agreed to make a number of monthly payments to defendant and upon completion thereof defendant was to
repay plaintiff a fixed sum. After he had made some payments plaintiff's business was destroyed by fire and he was forced to default. The
83
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1477 (1937). Contra is the well-known
minority doctrine of Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 {1834).
8
~ 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 1475 (1937). See 27 CoRN. L. Q. 276
(1942).
85
5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., § 1474 (1937).
88
3 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 791 (1936); 52 HARV. L. REv. 129
(1938); 2 WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., §§ 579, 599 (1924). The lJniform Conditional Sales Act, §§ I 9 and 20, purports to remedy the situation.
87
Dooley v. Stillson, 46 R.I. 332, 128 A. 217 (1925).
88
Seekins v. King, 66 R.I. 105, 17 A. (2d) 869 (1941), 134 A.L.R. 1060 at
1064 (1941).
89
292 N.Y. 286, 54 N.E. (2d) 828 (1944), noted, 30 CoRN. L. Q. 392
(1945), 45 CoL. L. REv. 72 (1945).
90
N.Y. Legislative Doc. No. 65, (F), p. 17 (1942). See also notes in 27 CoR1".
L. Q. 276 (1942); 45 CoL. L. REV. 72 (1945).
91
64 Ohio App. 398, 28 N.W. {2d) 794 (1940).
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court ruled that the contract provision for forfeiture in such case was
invalid and held that since plaintiff's breach was not wilful, he was
entitled to restitution "to the extent that defendant would otherwise be
unjustly enriched." 92
C. The contract is illegal
The general principle is forcefully expressed by Lord Mansfield's
oft-quoted statement in Holman v. Johnson/ 3 "No court will lend its
aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an
illegal act. If from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause
of action appears to arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the court says he has no right to be
assisted. It is upon that ground the court goes; not for the sake of the
defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff.
So if the plaintiff and defendant were to change sides, and the defendant were to bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would
then have the advantage of it; for where both are equally in fault,
potior est conditio defendentis." 9 ¾ The only question seems to be how
far should courts go in developing exceptions to this principle.95
92
Id. at 402, citing 2 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 357 (1932); RESTITUTION
RESTATEMENT, § 180 (1937).
93
I Cowp. 341, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775).
1l¾ Id at 343. This doctrine has not gone unquestioned. See Wigmore, "A Summary of Quasi-Contracts," 25 AM. L. REv. 695 (1891). "The real theory of pori
Jelicto seems to be that the plaintiff loses his right by partaking in wrong-doing.•..
But the whole notion is radically wrong in principle and produces extreme injustice. If
A owes B $ 5000 why should he not pay it whether B has violated a statute or nod
Where the issue is as to the rights of two litigants, it is unscientific to impose a penalty
incidentally by depriving one of the litigants of his admitted right. It is unjust, also,
for two reasons: first, one guilty party suffers, while,;i,nother of equal guilt is rewardedi
secondly, the penalty is usually utterly disproportionate to the offense•••• The expedient that naturally suggests itself is merely to order the sum due to be paid into court
and to deduct from it such portion as may be named by the proper tribunal as the
penalty for the violation of the law." Id at 71 2 et seq.
95
See Schaffer v. Federal Trust Co., 132 N.J. Eq. 235, 28 A. (2d) 75 (1942)
(lending money to be used, as lender knows, for an unlawful purpose is no bar to
lender's right to enforce his contract, in the absence of serious moral turpitude or statute
forbidding recovery).
But in Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., Inc., 132 N.J. Eq. 398, 28 A. (2d) 181
( l 942), where a borrower had wilfully violated the Small Loan Act by a scheme of
obtaining loans in an excessive amount through fictitious persons, and a loan company
knowingly approved of the borrower's acts, the parties were held to be in "pari delicto."
The borrower was denied cancellation of her notes and restitution of sums paid thereon
and the lender was not allowed to collect the balance due on them, the court pointing
out that the purpose of the Small Loan Act was to protect a small loan borrower from
usury of the lender, but the act does not divest equity from its time honored maxims
that he who seeks equity must do equity and must have clean hands.
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The old controversy as to the effect of an illegal prior contract, in
which the parties to the present controversy were concerned and from
which the money now in dispute was derived, was again raised in
Rogers v. Lassiter.95 a Plaintiff's intestate, an Indiana lawyer residing
in Oklahoma, and defendants, two Oklahoma lawyers, contracted with
a client to conduct certain litigation for a contingent fee. The case was
won and the fee paid to defendants, the attorneys of record, who refused to account to plaintiff for his intestate's share on the ground that
both they and the client had by the intestate's fraud been induced to
believe that the intestate was a member of the Oklahoma bar. In an
action "for money had and received by defe~dants for plaintiff's use
. and benefit," the court held for the plaintiff, pointing out whatever
might be the merits of this contention in an action upon the original
co.µtract, "the rule is entirely inapplicable to the fact situation in the
pres~nt case," sin~e "the distinction is between enforcing an illegal
.contract, and asserting title to money and, property which has arisen
from it." 95 b
As to enrichment conferred in the course of an illegal contract where
a plaintiff relies on the doctrine of locus poenitentiae,98 there is a commendable tendency to abandon the distinction between contracts
thought by the courts to be malum in se and those which are malum
prohibitum in favor of considerations of public policy designed to prevent violations of the law rather than a desire to aid the penitent; 97
and the same tendency to consider public policy is shown where the
issue is whether the parties are or are not to be deemed in pari delicto. 98
. Typical of the latter situation and illustrative of many similar cases is
Local Federal Savings & Loan Association of Oklahoma City v.
95

a 196 Okla. 228, 164 P. (2d) 632 (1945).
As pointed out in 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., §§ 1785-1786 (1938),
courts usually deny relief where the illegal transaction involves a partnership, which
appears to be the principal case, although they generally allow restitution· where the
illegal transaction is one of agency.
98 In Kyne v. Kyne, 16 Cal. (2d) 436, 106 P. (2d) 620 (1940), the court
ruled that in view of the statutory illegality of the wager in question the loser could not
obtain restitution from his stakeholder after the event, on the ground that the parties
were in pari delicto. The case is noted in 29 CAL. L. REv. 418 ( I 941).
97 See note, 89 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 660 (1941). In Palmer Bros. v. Havens,
(Tenn. 1945) 193 S.W. (2d) 91, plaintiff was given restitution of $200 earnest
money paid defendant on a land purchase contract initiated and consummated on a Sunday in violation of statute making it a misdemeanor to exercise any of the common
vocations on that day, on the ground that, although the parties may have been in pari
delicto, the contract was still executory.
98 See 26 VA. L. REv. 362 (1940), discussing Council v. Cohen, 303 Mass. 348,
21 N.E. (2d) 967 (1939).
,
95
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Sheets. 99 Here the Home Owners' Loan Corporation had refunded a
certain mortgage indebtedness without knowledge that the creditor was
taking from the debtor a second mortgage for the difference between
the proceeds of the new loan and the amount of the original debt. In
an action by the borrower to cancel the second mortgage and to recover
his payments made thereon, the court held for plaintiff, on the ground
that the second mortgage was invalid as tending to stifle the beneficial
purpose of the H.O.L. Act, and that money paid under an illegal
contract may be recovered when, as here, the illegality grows out of a ,
law designed for the protection of the party seeking recovery, since
thereby public policy is best served.100
In Brooks v. Brooks 101 plaintiff, who was partially paralyzed, had
employed defendant as a nurse for several years, when she threatened
to leave him unless he married her. He then contracted to continue to
pay her for her services and married her. After four years, she left
him. Plaintiff was allowed to recover the money paid her during their
marriage under their contract, on the ground that the contract was
against public policy and "void"; the parties were not in pari delicto
and his payments were without consideration since it was her marital
duty to care for her husband.
In Costanzo Coal Mining Company v. Weirton Steel Company 102
the plaintiff was allowed to recover the difference between the price
paid by defendant for coal purchased from plaintiff and the minimum
price for coal established under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937. To ,
the objection that the buyer's obligation was not enforceable at the suit
of a seller who was a party to the illegal agreement and therefore a
wrongdoer and not entitled to the aid of the court, if wa.s pointed out
that to allow recovery would promote the right of the public to effectuate the purposes of the statute.108
99
191 Okla. 439, 130 P. (2d) 825 (1942). See annotation on Home Owner's
Loan Act, 125 A.L.R. 809 (1940). See also 38 MICH. L. REV. 508 (1940); 28 CAL. L.
REV. 232 (1940).
100
See also First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Ansell, 68 Ohio App. 369, 41 N.E.
(2d) 420 (1941), where debtor was allowed restitution of payments made by him on
his cognovit note secretly taken by his creditor. Where H.O.L.C. consents to the additional security being taken from the debtor by the original creditor, the transaction is
valid and enforceable, Shiver
Liberty Bldg.-Loan Assn., 16 Cal. (2d) 296, 106 P.
(2d) 4 (1940). See, contra to the principal case, Krause v. Swanson, 141 Neb. 256,
3 N.W. (2d) ·407 (1942).
101
48 Cal. App. (2d) 347, 119 P. (:id) 970 (1941).
102
(C.C.A. 8th, 1945) 150 F. (2d) 929 (cited for another point, supra, p. 940
and note 21) •
108
•
Citing, inter alia, 2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 601 (1932), and WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1632 (1937).
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In Lyons v. Otter Tail Power Company,1° 4 plaintiff, a customer,
innocently Bntered into and performed an agreement with a public
utility for an extension of steam heat mains to his building without first
complying with a statutory requirement that such a contract should be
filed and approved by the Board of Railroad Commissioners. Plaintiff's suit to rescind the contract and to obtain restitution of his payments made thereunder was upheld by a divided court (5-2) on the
theory that as plaintiff was not aware that the contract was unlawful,
and as the statute was enacted for the benefit of a class to which plaintiff
belonged and the regulation of a class to which defendant belonged,
plaintiff was not equally in the wrong with the defendant.
So also, restitution is usually allowed of premiums paid upon a life
insurance policy which is void for lack of an insurable interest, where
by the representations of the defendant's agent the plaintiff had been
led to believe that he was entering into a binding and enforceable contract.105
Peculiar difficulties arise where a person conveys property in fraud
of his creditors and thereafter restitution is sought from the grantee.
In general, relief is denied, but the exceptions are numerous. Thus it is
sometimes held, as in Duttkin v. Zalenski 106 that where the grantor's
estate is insolvent his personal representative may recover the property
transferred by the deceased in fraud of creditors to the extent necessary
to enable him to satisfy their claims.107
Cook v. Mason,108 was a suit in equity to set aside a conveyance of
land which plaintiff •had made to defendants, her brothers, "to protect
herself" against the result of an action for damages about to be brought
against her; which action, when brought, resulted in a judgment in
her favor. The court set aside the conveyance, pointing out that plaintiff was guilty of no wrong in her attempt to discourage an unauthorized· claim.109
·
104 70 N.D. 681, 297 N.W. 691 (1941).
105 Washington v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 175 Tenn. 529, 136 S.W. (2d) 493
(1940), 129 A.L.R. 54 at 57 (1940).
106 136 N.J. Eq. 81, 40 A. (2d) '357 (1945).
107 Compare Rush v. Curtis Wright Export Co., 175 Misc. 873, 25 N.Y.S. (2d)
597 (1941). Defendant company offered the agent for the Government of Colombia a
commission and bonuses on all sales of material made to Colombia. The agent's assignee sued to collect such commission. Held, recoverable, but the assignee must hold
the proceeds as constructive trustee for Colombia. The case is noted with approval
in 55 HARV. L. REV. 143 (1941).
108
353'Mo. 993, 185 S.W. (2d) 793 (1945).
109
'Compare Blaine v. Krysowaty, 135 N. J. Eq. 355 at 358, 38 A. (2d) 859
( 1944), where the granter of a fraudulent conveyance having paid his creditors was denied
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Again in Brehm v. Brehm,110 where the grantee induced the transfer by fraudulently representing to the grantor that he was in danger
of prosecution for failure to pay income taxes, rescission and restitution
were allowed on the ground that the plaintiff's signature to the conveyance was obtained by the defendant's fraud. Novak. v. Nowak 111 is to
much the same effect. Here the plaintiff, a native of Poland, past 70,
who could not read or write English, on being served with a summons
upon an administrator's bond which he had signed as surety, was put in
fear of losing his home. Defendant, his favorite son whom he trusted,
suggested: "you sign the property to me and I will hold it for you until
the trouble is over." The son, postponing inquiry as to the nature of
the father's liability, promptly arranged for the deed to be prepared
and executed. Had inquiry first been made the father's fears of losing
the property would have vanished at once, since his liability was small,
and he took care of it by a cash payment from his savings. The court
decreed a reconveyance of the land, pointing out that if in fact the
father had intended to defeat his creditors, it was upon a scheme devised, suggested, and directed by the son, who may have been prompted
more by a desire to defraud his unlettered and trusting father out of
his home than to protect him from his creditors. Thus a court of equity
should not permit the son to have an unconscionable profit by such a
transaction.m
A liberal approach to the problem is found in Hurwitz v. Hurwitz 118 A had transferred property to B, his brother, in order to put
the property beyond the reach of a former wife of A who claimed alimony. A, having died, his administratrix sued to recover the property
for the benefit of the heirs of the deceased. The court, in an able
opinion by Thurman Arnold, J., allowed restitution, referring to Professor Scott's characterization of the rule which permits the transferee
to keep the property as being "so arbitrary in its operatipn that its value
as a preventive measure may well be doubted," 114 and pointing out that
restitution, the court saying that "rights of fraud-doers are not looked at in the light
of the wrong they accomplish but of the wrong they plan." Quoted from Semenowich
v. Melnyk, 93 N. J.,Eq. 615 at 620, II7 A. 832 (1922).
110
347 Pa. 271, 32 A. (2d) 216 (1943).
111
•
216 Ind. 673, 25 N.S. (2d) 993 (1940).
112
See Gray v. Gray, 246 Ala. 6z7, 2z S. (2d) 21 (1945), where on very
similar facts the court granted restitution, saying that, in view of the confidential
relations and undue influence, to withhold relief rather than grant restitution would to
a greater extent offend public morals.
113
78 App. D.C. 70, 136 F. (2d) 796 (1943), 148 A.L.R. 226 at 230 (1944).
The annotation points out that this is strictly a minority view. The decision !S commended in 57 HARv. L. REv. 25z (1943).
114
3 ScO'IT, TRus-rs, § 42z (1939).
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the defendant has no right to hold the property and thus there seems
no reason why persons whose hands are clean should be precluded from
claiming it because their anc_estor soiled his own in the transaction.m
Similarly the innocent grantee of a conveyance in fraud of creditors
has been allowed his disbursements before he discovered the fraud, and
maintenance expenditures thereafter.116
' A case on the opposite side of the fence is Willig v. Gold,111 where
a plaintiff paid defendant, an unl1censed business opportunity broker,
a c~mmission of $3000 for selling plaintiff's business. Both acted in
violation of an express statutory prohibition, though the statutory
penalty for defendant's act was the greater. Defendant, disgusted at
receiving so small a fee, notified plaintiff's insurance brokers that
plaintiff had falsely represented the extent of his business, whereby
plaintiff had to pay the brokers $30,000. Defendant's ?,greement with
the brokers entitled him to receive from them upwards of $7000
for the information furnished by him. Upon an interpleader by the
brokers as to this sum, the plaintiff claimed his $3000 back, as well
as damages for defendant's violation of a confidential relation. The
court' held for the defendant, saying that restitution of the plaintiff's
payment of $3000 should be denied, since "in the absence of some
compelling public policy ( which we cannot discover here) rio cause of
action can be grounded upon appellant's own violation of an explicit
statutory .prohibition placed upon him," and that an agent is under no
duty not to disclose his principal's dishonest acts to the party prejudicially affected by them. 118
The same issu~ of public policy is involved in the cases preferring
the amateur gambler to the professional, of which Bamman v. Erickson 119 is the latest exponent, and that preferring the would-be ch~ater
115

ln Zak v. Za~, 305 Mass. 194, 25 N.E.' (2d) 169 (1940), a husband deposited money in a bank in his wife's name in order to avoid a possible attachment.
Held, he was entitled to an order compelling her to turn over the money to him. To
the contention that the deposit was a part of a fraudulent scheme the court replied:
(1) the husband is not obliged to rest his claim on such alleged fraud; (2) no fraud
having, been practiced on the wife she cannot rely upon the alleged attempt of her
husband to defraud a third person. See 24 MINN. L. REV. 872 (1940).
116
Angers v. Sabatinelli, 235 Wis. 422, 293 N.W. 173 (1940), noted, 39 1'41cH.
L. REV. 654 (1941), 27 VA. L. REv. 1062 (1941).
117
{Cal. App. 1946) 171 P. (2d) 754.
118 The latter point is upheld by 2 AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 4u { l 93 3). See
Weld-Blundell v. Stephens, [1919] 1 K.B. 520.
119 288 N.Y. 133, 41 N.E. (2d) 920 (1942) {statute allowing the loser to recover
a wager which he has paid held not available to a professional gambler because (I) his
act being a crime cannot give rise to a cause of action and (2) he is not within the
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in a bunco game who is double-crossed by a professional swindler,
Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Simpson. 120 In this case the majority and dissenting opinions relied respectively on the opposing
opjnions in Stewart v. Wright,1 21 the famous "Buckfoot Gang Case."
Flegenheimer v. Brogan 122 should not be omitted from this discussion, although the plaintiff sought restitution by way of an action of
tort fot conversion rather than in quasi-contract. In that case the
plaintiff's intestate had been the owner of the capital stock in a brewing
company. Federal and state licenses to operate the brewery having
been denied because of his ownership, the intestate transferred his
shares to Vogel, a dummy, whereupon the required licenses were obtained and the brewery went into operation. Alleging that after the
death of the intestate the defendant, by the subterfuge of a pretended
purchase thereof, acquired the corporation's capital stock, with knowledge that it belonged to the plaintiff, plaintiff sued for conversion of
the stock. The defendant's answer set up as a defense the above fraudulent scheme to conceal from the federal and state authorities the identity of plaintiff's intestate as the true and undisclosed owner and operator of the brewery. The court of appeals, three of the seven judges
dissenting, upheld this defense on the ground that since the owner had
parted with his title to the property in order to perpetrate a fraud upon
the statute which regulates and controls traffic in alcoholic beverages
those transactions were so far against the public good as to disable the
plaintiff from invoking the aid of the court in her endeavor to disengage herself ( as administratrix) from the unlawfulness of the conduct
of her intestate.128 The dissenting judges took the view that in operating under a license obtained through fraud, intestate's act was the
'equivaleht of running a brewery without a license, subjecting him to
fines and imprisonment. However, intestate did not become an outlaw
and to suffer forfeiture of the property at the hands of any stranger
is not one of the consequences prescribed by the statutes for the violation of their provisions, and it is not open to the courts td add such a
penalty. So far as concerns the doctrine that where the parties are engaged in an illegal scheme the courts will not aid the· one or the
other,124 that doctrine is inapplicable here, for in the present action the
intent of the statute}. See note discussing the case, 27 MINN. L. REV. 94 (1942);
authorities collected 141 A.L.R. 941 (1942).
·
120
109 Colo. 53, 121 P. (2d) 663 (1942).
121
(C.C.A. 8th, 1906) 147 F. 321.
122
284 N.Y. 268, 30 N.E. (2d} 591 (1940), 132 A.L.R. 612 at 619 (1941).
128
Citing RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 149 (l937).
12
' Citing id., § 140.
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plaintiff does not have to rely upon any illegal scheme in order to
establish a good cause of action.125 To allow the interposition of the
affirmative defense offered by the defendant will be to impose consequences of an exceedingly harsh character upon persons who, in dealing with their property, are guilty of some infraction of the law. In
short, the dissenters claimed that the decision went beyond the bounds
theretofore fixed by- the authorities and was unnecessary upon any
reason of public policy; although one of them suggested that "As to
the original dummy of the deceased, I agree that public policy would
require a dismissal of an action brought by plaintiff to obtain the
property." 126

D. Statute_ of frauds a defense to enforcement of contract
Almost universally restitution may be had of the value of benefits
conferred under a contract which is unenforceable because of the
Statute of Frauds where the statute is relied on by defendant. Thus in
Matthew v. Continental Roll and Steel Foundry Co. 121 plaintiff had
orally contracted to allow defendant to use plaintiff's inventions.
When defendant set up the statute of' frauds as a defense to plaintiff's
claim on their contract, plaintiff was allowed to recover the money
value of such use.128
,
The only troublesome question is as to the measure of plaintiff's
recovery. In Ricks v. Sumler 129 deceased had orally agreed with plaintiff, who apparently was his illegitimate daughter, to leave her all of
his property that he had when he died, in consideration of which
plajntiff had agreed to care for him and look after his farm during his
life. He died intestate. The court pointed out that action on the contract was barred by the Statute of Frauds, at least insofar as land was
concerned, but that the contract was not illegal but merely unenforce125
This distinction finds no support in the RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 140
(1937), although it is often relied upon to absolve a guilty plaintiff. See the opposing
views set out in Bosshard v. Steele Couµty, 173 Minn. 283, 217 N.W. 354 (1927).
Like Lord Mansfield, see note 88, supra, Professor Williston is opposed to the distinction. 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1753 (1938).
126
284 N.Y. 268 at 278, ·30 'N.E. (2d) 591 (1940). Perhaps the hesitancy of
the minority of the court indicates that the late Dean Wigmore's suggestion should be
incorporated into our law by statute. {See note 94, supra.)
127
(C.C.A. 3d, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 594.
128 The court cited RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § I (1937), and CoNTRACTI
RESTATEMENT, § 3 55 ( I 93 2), and pointed out that the question as to the validity of
the patent was immaterial. See infra, p. 961.
129 179 Va. 571, 19 S.E. (2d) 889 (1942). Accord, Winder v. Winder, 18 Cal.
(2d) 123, 114 P. (2d) 347 (1941).
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able. Plaintiff was permitted to recover "upon an implied assumpsit"
for the value of the services rendered; the cause of action accrued upon
the death of the promisor, he not having repudiated the contract in the
meantime. 180 The measure of recovery was held to be the value of the
services, not that of the property agreed to be conveyed.181 In Lemire
v. Haley 182 where services had been rendered by a foster daughter, the
court ruled that plaintiff's recovery, although limited to the value of
her services, should nbt be restricted to the compensation ordinarily
received by a domestic servant or nurse. It could well be found that
her work because of its high quality was reasonably worth more than
the rate customarily paid for the type of service performed. The fact ·
that she occupied the position of a foster daughter was a circumstance
to be considered with other evidence as tending to prove that her services were especially valuable.
·
However, in Rotea v. lzuel 183 it was alleged that deceased had
promised to pay plaintiff for services rendered by plaintiff in supporting deceased's invalid sister for some sixteen years, by letting plaintiff
have "what was left of his estate." Conceding that plaintiff could not
recover on the oral agreement because of the Statute of Frauds,
plaintiff claimed a quasi-contract liability, but the court held for the defendant, pointing out that the services in this case were not performed
with respect to or for the benefit of the deceased or any person to whom
deceased owed a legal duty of support, and "the law will not imply
an obligation from the mere fact that the deceased may have requested
plaintiff to perform services for a third person." 134 It was said that a
' quasi-contractual obligation is imposed only to prevent an unjust enridiment of a defendant because of the actual receipt of the services
by him or by his decedent.185
In Humm,el v. Humm,e/1 86 a father paid the premiums on a fifteen
:uio See note, 27 CAL. L. REV. 473 (1939), and Beard v. Melvin, 60 Cal. App.
(2d) 421, 140 P. (2d) 720 (1943).
181
Ordinarily the value of the property orally agreed to be transferred is not
admissible in estimating the value of the services performed. Reynolds v. Connor, 190
Okla. 323, 123 P. (2d) 664 (1941).
2
ll8 92 N.H. IO, 23 A. (2d) 769 (1942), 92 N.H. 358, 31 A. (2d) 62 (1943).
m 14 Cal. (2d) 605, 95 P. (2d) 927 (1939), 125 A.L.R. 1424 at 1428
(1940).
lH Id. at 6 IO.
1,3(; A note in 28 CAL. L. REv. 528 (1940), quite properly criticizes the case. See
2 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, §§355, 348 and comment a (1932), and RESTITUTION
RESTATEMENT, §§ 16, I and comments a and b (1937); also 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, § 536 (1936); 5 id.,§§ 1478-1480 (1937).
us 133 Ohio St.. 520, 14 N.E. (2d) 923 (1938).
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year endowment policy on his son's life of which the mother was the
beneficiary, under an oral agreement that the father and mother should
get the money upon maturity of the policy before the son's death. The
son, however, collected the amount thereof and refused to account
therefor to his father, relying on the Statute of Frauds. Held, that the
father could recover in quasi-contract al}. amount equal to the premiums
paid by him.
Where it is the plaintiff who after part performance on his part
refuses to complete his performance of an oral contract, the defendant
being ready and willing to perform, restitution is generally denied,18'
save in a jurisdiction where the doctrine of Britton v. Turner prevails.138
·
E. Impossibility and .frustration
Where, after part performance of a contract, impossibility or frustration of purpose justifies a failure further to perform it,189 usually
there arises a duty of restitution for any benefits received by the defendant from plaintiff's partial performance of the contract, less the
value of any counter-benefits received thereunder from the defendant
by the plaintiff.140 -·
' Of the recent English decisions in the whole field _of Restitution
doubtless the most important one is Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd.m overruling after nearly forty
years the much criticized Coronation Cases, of which Chandler v.
Webster 142 is the leading exponent. The plaintiff, a Polish manufacturing company, on July 12, 1939, contracted with the defendant com137Thompson v. Schurman, 65 Cal: App. (2d) 432, 150 P. (2d) 509 (194-4-);
Graul v. Rohe, (Md. 1945) 43 A. (2d) 201. Lanham v. Reimann, 177 Ore. 193, 160
P.(2d) 318 (1945). ("In order for plaintiffs to prevail in this action, which is for
;money had and received, they must prove that defendant has received money which
in equity and good conscience belongs to them ..•• This they have failed to do." Id.
at 198.)
138 See WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 538 (1936). See note 83, supra.
139 The situations where impossibility or frustration excuse further performance
are set out in 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1935 (1937). See also, as to
frustration, Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. (2d) 48, 153 P. (2d) 47 (1944).
14°For a valuable discussion of commercial frustration and the consequent quasicontractual rights of the parties, see' Schroeder, "The Impact of the War on Private
Contracts," 42 MICH. L. REv. 603 (1944).
See also R. M. McELROY, IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE (1941); WEBBER,
THE EFFECT OF WAR ON CoNTRACTS ( I 940) ; Wade, "Consensus, Mistake, and Impossibility in Contract," 7 CAMB. L. J. 36 I ( I 94 I) ; typical law review discussions are
found in 28 VA. L. REv. 72 (1941); 53 CoL. L. REv. 404 (1943).
141
[1943] A. C. 32~ 144 A.L.R. 1298 at 1317 (1943).
142
[1904] I K.B. 493.
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pany for certain machines, to be manufactured by the defendant and
delivered to the plaintiff at Gdynia within three or four months, the
plaintiff making a down payment of £1000 on account of the purchase
price. Before the time for performance had arrived the Germans had
invaded Poland and seized Gdynia. In an action to recover their payment of £1000, on the ground that, since delivery at Gydnia had become impossible, the contract had been frustrated and that in consequence there was a total failure of consideration, the· trial court conceded the frustration but denied restitution of the £1000 on the authority of Chandler v. W c;bster. This judgment was affirmed by the'
Court of Appeal. The House of Lords reversed, and gave judgment
for the plaintiff. Of the seven considered opinions delivered by the
Law Lords the most valuable one is that of Lord Wright who, as on
previous occasions,143 showed himself to be a worthy successor of Lord
Mansfield in his understanding and appreciation of the· principle of
restitution to prevent an unjust enrichment. Lord Wright's opinion,
which should be read in its entirety to be fully appreciated, begins by
pointing out that "It is clear that any civilized system of law is bound
to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that .is to prevent a man from retaining the
money of, or some benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now recognized to fall within a third category of the common law wh,ich has
been called quasi contract or restitution." 1 44, He quoted Lord Mansfield's "familiar passage" in Moses v. Macferlan, 146 and emphasized
that "The defendant has the plaintiff's money. There was no intention
to enrich him in the events which happened.146 • • • The claim for repayment is not based on the contract which is dissolved on the frustration
but on the fact that the defendant has received the money and has on
the events which have supervened no right to keeF it. The same event
which automatically renders performance of the consideration for the
payment impossible, not only terminates the contract as to the future,
but terminates the right of the payee to retain the money which he has
received only on the terms of the contract performance." 147 In conclusion Lord Wright said: "No doubt, in some cases the recipient of the
148
See note 1, supra, p. 936.
m [1943] A.C. 32 at 61.
145
z Burr. 1005 (1760).
146
[1943] A.C. 32 at 64.
m [1943] A.C. 32 at 65.
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payment may be exposed to hardship if he has to return the money
though before the frustration he has incurred the bulk of the expense
and is then left with things on his hands which become valueless to him
when the contract fails, so that he gets nothing and has to return the
prepayment. These and many other difficulties show that the English
rule of recovering payment the consideration for which has failed works
a rough justice. It was adopted in more primitive times and was based
orl the simple theory that a man who has paid in advance for something
which he has never got ought to have his money back. It is further
imperfect because it depends on an entire consideration and a total
failure. Courts of equity have evolved a fairer method of apportioning
an entire consideration in cases where a premium has been paid for a
partnership which has been ended before its time: Partnership Act,
s.40; contrary to the common law rule laid down in W hincup v.
Hughes. 148 Some day the legislature may intervene to remedy these
defects."149
The defects last mentioned have since been ·cured, in part at least,
in England by the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, r943,150
and are not so serious in many of our states.151
The American courts have not hesitated to give relief in situations
like those of the Fibrosa case. Thus in Strauss v. United States Lines
Company 152 where after plaintiff's intestate had bought in Germany
from defendant company a steamship ticket from New York to Hamburg, a presidential order prohibited defendant's ship from sailing to
148

L.R. 6 C.P. 78 (1871).
[1943] A.C. 32 at 72. A note in 20 CAN. B. REv. 710 (1942), discussing
the Fibrosa case, regrets that the court felt unable to relieve against these matters. The
principal case is discussed and very generally approved in numerous law joµrnals,
notably, Schroeder, "The Impact of the War on Private Contracts," 42 M1cH. L. REv.
903 (1944); 58 L. Q. REV. 442 (1942); 56 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1942); 91 UNIV.
PA. L. REv. 262 (1942). Williams, "The End of Chandler v. Webster," 6 Moo. L.
REv. 46 (1944). See also McElroy and Williams, "The Coronation Cases," 4 Moo.
L. REV. 241 (1941); 5 id. l (1941); 16 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 339 (1942).
150
See Professor McNair's discussion of the act in "The Law Reform (Frustrated
Contracts) Act, 1943," 60 L. Q. REV. 160 (1944) and Professor Glanville L. Williams' monograph entitled THE LAW REFORM (FRUSTRATED CoNTRAcTS) AcT, 1943
(1944). Williams, "The End of Chandler v. Webster," 6 Moo. L. REV. 46 (1942);
7 id. 66 (1944).
151
See 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 1974 (1938). But see Schroeder,
"The Impact of the War on Private Contracts," 42 MICHL. REV. 603 (1944). .
152
(N.Y.C. Mun. Ct.. 1943) 40 N.Y.S. (2d) 877. A further element
of impossibility in this case was that the ticket purchased by the deceased was nontransferable and the purchaser had died. In this aspect the case is analagous to a contract for personal service where the servant dies or becomes ill after a partial performance of his contract. See 2 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT,§ 468 and illustration 1 (1932).
149
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Germany. Restitution of the purchase money was allowed on the
ground that performance by defendant had become impossible. 158
However, it is held that a supervening frustration, like supervening
impossibility, is not a ground for rescission of a completely executed
contract. Thus, the completed purchase of a draft on Manila, which
because of war conditions subsequently became uncollectible, was held
not rescindable. 154
A troublesome question of construction arose in Shelton v. Tuttle
Motor Company. 155 In October, 1941 plaintiff "traded" an old automobile to defendant, plaintiff leaving $175 on deposit toward the purchase of a new car. Contemplating some delay in making delivery, the
parties at the time agreed in writing that defendant should not be held
liable "for any delay or failure through any cause whatsoever in making delivery." Subsequently, all deliveries of new automobiles were
frozen by a rationing order issued pursuant to an act of Congress,
which order provided that "any person who has made any payment on
account of a purchase of a new automobile shall upon demand be entitled to the return thereof." Plaintiff's application to the rationing
board for a new car was denied. In an action to recover the amount of
such deposit, it was held ( 4-3) for defendant. The contract of the
parties, said the court, controls the situation and the federal pronouncements were intended for other facts. There were two vigorous dissenting opinions, one of them stating that the decision is a "denial of Federal wartime power over civilian contracts." 156
Of course the general principle allowing restitution of benefits conferred under a contract, further performance of which is prevented
by supervening impossibility not contracted against by the parties, is
not confined to situations created by war. A well-considered recent
153
There is much discussion in the law reviews and a host of decisions on the
effect of war on contracts. In general, it may be said that if because of a statute, a
governmental order, or mere wartime conditions one is excused from further performance of his contract, he is entitled to restitution of benefits conferred by his partial
performance, subject to a deduction for any advantages whkh he himself may have
received. See the article by Schroeder, ''The Impact of the War on Private Contracts,"
42 MICH. L. REv. 603 (1944).
164
Kerr Steamship Company v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, 292
N.Y. 253, 54 N.E. (2d) 813 (1944), 153 A.L.R. 382 at 393 (1944). This is somewhat analogous to the cases where after the purchase of a note the maker becomes insolvent and in consequence the note becomes uncollectible. Case noted in 44 CoL. L.
REV. 777 (1944).
.
.
155
223 N.C. 63, 25 S.E. (2d) 451 (1943).
156
Id. at 69. Citin'g 2 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § "468 (1) (1932), and
RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 66 (3) (1937), as well as 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,
rev. ed.,§§ 1769, 1792, 1794 (1938).
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decision is Lamb v. Caljfornia Water & Telephone Company,m where
one Lake, the owner of land, had contracted with defendant Water
Company for a perpetual right to the use of sufficient water to irrigate
his land, in consideration of a grant by Lake to defendant of an easement to maintain a water main across his land. Fifty years later, pur-.
suant to a rate regulation of the State Railroad Commission, the ·company proceeded to charge the plaintiff, Lake's suc~essor in interest,
for water so used. The court held that the issuance of the regulation
excused, and indeed prohibited, the water company from further performance of its contract to supply plaintiff with water without charge,
but that plaintiff was entitled to restitution, since justice required that
defendant tompensate plaintiff to the amount of the value of the
riparian right taken from him, as well as the value of the easement
for the maintenance of the water main, less the value of the benefits
received by Lake and his successor in interest. So too, in Rayner v.
McCabe 158 where a niece contracted to live with an aunt and render
personal services to her in consideration of a conveyance of realty to
the niece, there was an entire failure of consideration for the conveya~ce where the aunt's death rendered performance by the niece impossible and the niece was held to be uuder a duty to reconvey the land.us
Again, in Bissonnette v. Keyes 100 it was held that where, after execution of contract for sale of dairy farm, stock, and hay, but before 'time
fixed for performance, the barn on the premises and the hay therein
were destroyed by fire and the owner had sold the stock to another, the
purchaser was entitled to rescind and to claim a return of his deposit.
An attorney discharged without probable cause, aside from whatever rights he may have for damages for breach of contract~161 is entitled to recover, or, if he dies, his personal representative is similarly
entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services up to the time
of discharge or death,162 although if his retainer was on a contingent fee
151

21 Cal. (2d) 33, 129 p; (2d) 371 (1942).
us 319 Mass. 3II, 65 N.E. (2d) 417 (1946).
159
In fact, at the time of the conveyance by the aunt to the niece the niece had
executed a reconveyance, doubtless as security for performance on her part. The court
declined to set aside the reconveyance for the reason stated above.
160
319 Mass. 134, 64 N.E. (2d) 926 (1946). This decision depends, in part at
least, on the Massachusetts rule that risk of loss by destruction of the premises is on the
vendor of realty.
·
161
See 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1029, (1936).
,
162
Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 21 A. (2d) 396 (1941). ·See city of Barnsdall v. Curnutt, (Okla. 1945) 174 P. (2d) 596 {attorney's lien enforced).
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basis the claim is not collectible unless and until the case has been
won.1as
Where, as in the Lamb case,16c1, the benefit conferred is by way of
something other than money or services, the courts have not always
been so willing to grant restitution, notably where the transaction involved a conveyance of an interest in land.165

VI
BENEFITS CONFERRED UNDER COMPULSION

-A. Discharge of defendant's obligation
An interesting consequence of the rule which allows restitution
where one is compelled to perform another's duty is found in Hamlen
166
'U. Welch.
A trustee, being personally liable therefor, had paid certain taxes assessed against property of the trust estate. The trust estate
having meantime become valueless, he could not avail himself of his
right of reimbursement. It was held that the trustee could deduct as a
"bad debt" the amount of the taxes so paid from his personal income
tax return.
In Brown v. Rosenbaum 167 shareholders of a National Bank were
by statute made individually liable to the amount of the par value of

. Echlin v. Superior Court in and for San Mateo County, 13 Cal. (2d) 368,

168

90 P. (2d) 63 (1939).
16c1, Supra, note 157.
165
In Cowley v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 68 Wash. 558, 123 P. 998
(1912). 41 L.R.A. (n.s.) 559 (1913), a deed of land was given in consideration of
an agreement to provide the grantor with an annual pass on the grantee railroad for
life. Grantor was denied relief when the issuance of such passes was later forbidden by
the Hepburn Act. The contra and more commonly accepted view seems preferable.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Crowe, 156 ~y 27, 160 S.W. 759 (1913), 49
L.R.A. (n.s.) 848 (1914). See note 14 A.L.R. 252 (1921) .. The same hesitation is
found in the decisions of some courts which refuse restitution of land conveyed in consideration of an agreement of support where impossibility intervenes. See Rayne1 v.
McCabe, 319 Mass. 311, 65 N.E. (2d) 417 (1946). In Teel v. Bank of Eureka, 42
Cal. App. (2d) 807, IIO P. (2d) 78 (1941), a deed was delivered in escrow, "not to
be delivered until grantor's death" and "in no event to be withdrawn" by the grantor,
upon an oral condition the grantee should support the grantor for life. On grantee's
death, held, grantor entitled to recover possession of the deed from the escrow holder
since there had been a "failure of consideration." Authorities collected in :;4 A.L.R.
136 (1925).
166 (C.C.A. 1st, 1940) n6 F. (2d) 413.
167 287 N.Y. 510, 41 N.E. (2d) 77 (1942); 141 A.L.R. 1345 at 1351 (1942),
collecting conflicting authorities. See to the same effect: Pennsylvania Co. v. Clark, 340
Pa. 433, 18 A. (2d) 807 (1941), noted, 26 MINN. L. REv. 534 (1942).
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their shares for the debts of the bank, and a shareholder who had transferred his shares within sixty days of the bank's failure was made
liable as if there had been no such transfer, to the extent that his transferee had failed to meet the statutory liability. Within sixty days of
the failure of a bank the plaintiff sold shares in the bank to a person
who in turn sold them to defendant, the owner of the shares at the
time of the failure. Plaintiff, having paid a judgment obtained under
the statute by the bank's receiver against him as a former shareholder,
.was held entitled to restitution from defendant.
Where one of two joint debtors has paid more than his share of a
judgment against them, by the weight of authority he may properly
take an assignment of the judgment and enforce it against the other,168
or be subrogated to the rights of the creditor.169
Another case involving subrogation is Terry v. Claypool.110 Plaintiffs had a judgment against Claypool for $ I ,200, execution on which
had been returned unsatisfied. Claypool paid off a mortgage on land in
which he and his wife each had a half interest. Held, that plaintiffs, by
action in the nature of a creditor's bill, wer~ entitled not only to have
sold Claypool's interest in the land but also to be subrogated to his
right of contribution against his wife for one half of the amount paid
by him with a provision for foreclosure of the lien unl~s she should
promptly make payment.
.
171
Western Casualty & Surety Company v. Meyer is an interesting
illustration of subrogation. Plaintiff, the wife of a general contractor
who had become insolvent, was induced by the agent of the contractor's
surety, the defendant, to advance to her husband $72,000 to enable
him to pay claims for labor and materials which the surety company
had guaranteed to pay. Held, plaintiff was entitled to restitution and
to be subrogated to the rights of the creditors against the surety.112
Whether a mortgagee who pays taxes on the mortgaged property
168
Exchange Elevator Co. v. Marshall, (Neb. 1946) 22 N.W. (2d) 403. The
decision in Jackson v. Lacey, 37 Cal. App. (2d) 551, IOO P. (2d) 313 (1940), that
no contribution can be had between co-sureties until the debt has been completely satisfied is obviously out of line. See note in 29 CAL. L. REv. 65 (1940), criticizing the
case. If a debt is discharged upon payment by a surety of even a small sum, the surety
so paying is entitled to a pro rata share of the sum so paid. Scales v. Scales, 218 N.C.
533, II S.E. (2d) 569 (1940); Labor v. Gall, (App. D.C. 1940) IIO F. (2d) 697.
169
North v. Albee, 155 Fla. 515, 20 S. (2d) 682 (1945), 157 A.L.R. 490 at
495 (1945). In a few states there is also a statutory remedy, e.g., Tucker v. Nicholson,
IZ Cal. (2d) 427, 84 P. (2d) 1045 (1938).
170
77 Ohio App. 87, 65 N.E. (2d) 889 (1945).
171
301 Ky, 487, 192 S.W. (2d) 388 (1946).
172
Citing RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT;-§ 162 (1937).
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should have relief against the mortgagor's assignee who has not assumed the mortgage, either by way of a quasi-contractual claim. or by
subrogation is still a disputed question. ma
Courts do not agree as to whether a person who shores up his
neighbor's building to prevent it from falling into an excavation made
by the first person on his own land is performing a duty owed by the
neighbor or is doing it for his own protection. If the former, restitution
for the expense incurred should be allowed, otherwise it should not.178

B. lnderwnity and contribution between joint tort-feasors and
their servants
The shadow of Lord Kenyon's opinion in Merryweather v.
Nixan m still hovers over this branch of the law, with its doctrine that
restitution by way of indemnity or contribution is not available between
negligent tort-feasors 176 save in special situations. Indemnity is allowed, of course, by a master against his negligent servant 176 and
against a person negligently creating a dangerous condition for which
the claimant is responsible in law.177 But in Massachusetts Bonding
and Insurance Co. v. Dingle-Clark Company 178 an insurance carrier of
172

a See note in 53 HARV. L. REv. 144 (1939) discussing conflicting cases and
favoring relief. However, 1 GLENN, MoRTGAGES, § 43.1 (1943) suggests that the
mortgagee should be barred unless his action is promptly brought, since "belated claims
after a closed transaction are hard to bear."
178
See Braun v. Harnack, 206 Minn. 572, 289 N.W. 553 (1940), where the
court held (3-2) that the duty of shoring was imposed by statute on plaintiff and
denied him restitution of his expenses. The case is noted in 24 MINN L. REv. 852
(1940); 88 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 1020 (1940); 50 YALE L. J. n25 (1941). Authorities collected in 129 A.L.R. 623 ( I 940).
1
8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799).
176
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Chapman, 167 Ore. 661, 120 P. (2d) 223
( I 941), expresses the usual rule.
176
Granquist v. Crystal Springs Lumber Co., 190 Miss. 572, 1 S. (2d) 216
( 1941). Contribution is available between co-employers of a common servant. Ocean
Accident and Guarantee Corp., Ltd. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., (Ariz.
1945) 162 P. (2d) 609.
171
Hollywood Barbecue Co., Inc. v. Morse, 314 Mass. 368, 50 N.E. (2d) 55
- (1943), D, under contract to remove meat scraps from plaintiff's restaurant, operated
without warning a trap door in the sidewalk abutting the restaurant and injured a
pedestrian, who recovered damages from plaintiff. Reimbursement was allowed since
defendant had created a nuisance. Popkin Bros., Inc. v. Volk's Tire Company, 20 N.J.
Misc. 1, 23 A. (2d) 162 (1941), defendant contracted to provide and keep in repair
the tires on plaintiff's fleet of trucks. Owing to defendant's negligence a tire rim flew
off and injured a pedestrian. Plaintiff having settled with him was held to be entitled to reimbursement from defendant, quoting RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, §§ 86,
93 (1937).
178
142 Ohio St. 346, 52 N.E. (2d) 340 (1943).
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an employer which had satisfied a judgment against the employer was
denied indemnity against a negligent contractor, not because the employer was under a non-delegable duty with respect to a dangerous
condition created by the contractor, but because in the words of the
Restatement of Restitution, "the payor not only knew of the dangerous
condition but acquiesced in its continuance, [ thereby becoming] .•• in
effect a joint participant with the other in the tortious conduct,"179 as
well as itself being independently negligent. Thus the usual doctrine
denying -indemnity or contribution between negligent tort-feasors was
applicable.180
A notable addition to the minority doctrine of allowing contribution l;,etween negligent tort-feasors is George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital
Transit Company 181 where Groner, C. J., said, in part:
"In most of such case~ [ denying contribution] the reason for
the application of the no-contribution rule was said to be based
· on the principle that the knowledge of a person that he is respon_sible for all the consequences of a wrong will serve to restrain him,
and will thus induce persons to guard themselves a little more
warily against participation with others in acts which might produce tort liability. That there may be some basis for this theory in
cases in which persons 'directly contemplate the commission of a
wrongful act is obvious, but that it applies equally in cases of unintentional wrong strains one's credulity. To believe that the rule
of no contribution will tend to make a careless person careful, or
that a motorist who is not deterred from carelessness by fear of
personal danger will be affected in his conduct by a legal rule of
no contribution between joint wrongdoers, seems to us wholly
fanciful. And this, yve think, is the present trend of those courts
in which the question has recently been considered. And the reason for the change of view, though variously expressed, in the
main hinges c;m the doctrine that general principles of justice require that in the case of a common obligation, the discharge of it
by one of the. obligors without proportionate payment from the ·
other, gives the latter an advantage to which he is not equitably
entitled. As the result, it is now, we think, definitely established
in the better considered cases that there may be contribution in
179

§ 95, comment a (1937).
Of course, under any theory, the one primarily liable is not entitled to contribution, much less to indemnity from one who is secondarily liable. McKenna T.
Austin, (App. D.C. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 659.
181
(App. D.C. 1942) 126 F. (2d) 219. '
180

RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,
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favor of one who has vicariously been required to bear the whole
loss." 182
In Fisher v. Diehl,188 a Pennsylvania case where contribution between .negligent tort-feasors is allowed, the plaintiff, a wife, was injured through the combined negligence of her husband and Diehl.
When she sued Diehl, he obtained a rule making the husband an
additional defendant. It was held that plaintiff's judgment against
both defendants should be affirmed, with the provision that no execution be issued against the husband. The· court said that Diehl, upon
payment by him of this judgment, could then enforce contribu~ion
against the husband, pointing out that this "was not equivalent to permitting an action by the wife against her husband" and that "the legal
unity of husband and wife and the preservation of domestic peace and
felicity between them are desirable things .to maintain where they do
not produce injustice to the wife and where they do not inflict injustice
upon outsiders and deprive them of their legal rights." 18¼
Frank Martz. Coach Co., Inc. v. Hudson Bus Transportation Co.,
Inc.,185 is interesting. Plaintiff bus company, a common carrier, hired
from defendant a bus to be driven by defendant company's employee,
defendant Synder. A passenger was injured in a collision resulting from'
the negligence of Snyder. Action is now brought in the.name of the plaintiff, for the use of its insurance carrier which had paid the claims, to
recover the amount so paid plus the attorney's fees. The court, confronted by the New Jersey rule that there can be no contribution nor
indemnification between joint tort-feasors, nevertheless gavl judgment for plaintiff against the individual defendant by resorting to the
doctrine that plaintiff, a common carrier, cannot delegate its duties and
that therefore Snyder became its servant, relying upon the decisions
"that the porter of a sleeping car was, while assisting the railroad company in carrying out its contract of transportation with the passenger,
182

Id. at 220. Edgerton, J., dissented, relyi11g upon the argum_ents presented by
Professor James in his article, "Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic
Criticism," 54 HARV. L. REv. u56 (1941). See also, Gregory, "Contribution among
Joint Tortfeasors: A Defence," 54 HARV. L. REv, II 70 ( 1941) ; James, "Replication,"
54 HARV. L. REV, II78 (1941); Gregory, "Rejoinder," 54 HARV. L. REV, II84
(1941). See 55 HARv. L. REv. 1220 (1942) discussing New York statute allowing contribution between joint tort-feasors.
188
156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A. (2d) 915 (1945).
1
8¼ Id. at 484.
185
(N.J. S. Ct. 1945) 44 A. (2d) 488.
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the servant of the company although it did not own the sleeping car, or
hire or pay the porter." 186 ·
In American Motorists Insurance Company v. Vigen 181 the plaintiff and defendant were sued jointly in a personal injury action. Judgment was entered for the defendant and against the plaint,iff. The
plaintiff satisfied the judgment and sued for contribution. The court
held that the prior judgment absolving one of the two former defendants was res judicata in the other's subsequent action for contribution.188 In Godfrey v. Tidewater Power Company, one impleaded 189
joint tort-feasor was permitted to bring in his co-tort-feasor for the
purpose of enforcing a statutory right of contribution.

C. Duress and undue influence
Until recently it had been thought that duress was not a tort, except where a trespass to the person was •involved, but of late a few
cases have recognized that what is commonly called duress of property
or of business is also tortious.190 Thus assumpsit to recover money paid
the vendor might well be called a type of "waiver of tort," although it
seems never to have been so considered by the courts, despite the fact
that it is commonly said that duress is a species of fraud, "differing
from deceit in that it overcomes volition by a less artistic method." 191
But since duress in some of its more modern and tenuous forms and
· undue influence shade into one another and since the latter is not always tortious because it may exist where the defendant's conduct is
"in a moral sense innocent" 192 it is customary to link together duress -.
186 Id. at 491.
187 213 Minn.

IZO, 5 N.W. (2d) 397 (1942). Minnesota ordinarily allows
contribution between negligent joint tort-feasors.
188 The case is criticized in 56 HARV. L. REv. 477 (1942) as one "which
hampers the function of contribution," and is opposed to § 82 of the JUDGMENTS
RESTATEMENT. See, on kindred points, discussing the Uniform Contribution Act, 43
CoL: L. REv. 395 (1943).
·
As to Indemnity and Contribution under Workman's Compensation Laws, see 126
A.L.R. 881 (1940). 149 A.L.R. n86 (1944), 156 A.L.R. 931 (1945). See also
Larson, "A Problem in Contribution: the Tort-Feasor with an Individual Defense
against the Injured Party," 1940 Wis. L. REv. 467 (Wisconsin statute discussed).
189 223 N.C. 647, 27 S.E. (2d) 736 (1943).
190
White v. Scarritt, 341 Mo. 1004, I I I S.W. (2d) 18 (1937); Millsap v.
National Funding Corp. of Cal., 57 Cal. App. (2d} 772, 135 P. (2d) 407 (1943);
39 HARV. L. REv. 108 (1925); Corbin, "Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit,"
19 YALE L. J. 221 at 230 (1910); TORTS RESTATEMENT, § 871, comment f (1939).
191 Per Hallam, J. in Snyder v. Samuelson, 140 Minn. 57, 167 N.W. 287
(1918).
192 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1625 (1937). See Green, "Fraud, Undue In-
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and undue influence and discuss them separately from waiver of tort.
The real problem in most cases is whether duress or undue influence has been practiced: 193 and if so, the restitutionary remedy ordinarily is clear.1933 Only a few cases need be noted. By far the most interesting and im]!>ortant one is United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,194 where the government's claim for restitution of excessive payments made on war contracts during the first World War, on the alleged ground that it had been forced by duress into making an unconscionable contract in that the Bethlehem Company had taken advantage of the exigencies of war, was repudiated by the court, Justice
Frankfurter vigorously disseu.ting.195 Bethlehem would accept only
fluence and Mental Incompetency: A Study in Related Concepts," 43 CoL. L. REv.
176 (1943); 41 CoL. L. REv. 707 (1941); 60 L .• Q. REv. 341 (1944).
193
See Hale, "Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty," 43 CoL. L. Rev. 603
at 616-618 (1943), where it is said:
"The notion lingers on that coercion necessarily implies that the party to whom
it is applied has no volition, as does the converse notion that where he has volition,
or the ability to make a choice, there is no coercion or duress. As recently as 1942, in
United States o. Bethlehem Steel Corp., the Supreme Court denied the government's
contention that certain shipbuilding contracts made during the first World War were
made under duress. One of the two 'basic propositions' underlying the government's
contention, said Justice Black, was that 'the government's representatives involuntarily
accepted the Bethlehem's terms,' whereas 'there is no evidence of that state of overcome will which is the major premise of the petitioner's argument of duress.'" As
long ago as 1887 Justice Holmes exposed the fallacy of this reasoning in the Massachusetts case of Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153, 13 N.E. 596 (1887). More than
thirty years later, in Union Pacific Ry Co. v. Public Service Comm., 248 U.S. 67 at
70, 39 S. Ct. 24 (1918), Holmes again insisted that the existence of choice did not
disprove the existence of duress. "It always is for the interest of a party under duress,"
he said, "to choose the lesser of two evils. But the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not exclude duress. It is the characteristic of duress properly
so called." As is the case with blackmail, then, unlawful duress may be found even
when the victim has made a reasonable and deliberate choice to avoid a threat. And,
as in blackma"tl, it is not essential that the threat be to do some act which would be unlil.wful if performed for some other purpose. Dalzell, "Duress by Economic Pressure,"
20 N. C. L. REV. 237, 341 (1942); Winder, "Undue Influence in English and Scots
Law," 56 L. Q. REv. 97 (1940); 23 N. C. L. REv. 58 (1944).
It is often difficult to determine whether or not undue influence existed. Compare
Lochinger v. Hanlon, 348 Pa. 29, 3 3 A. ( 2d) I ( l 943) with Amanda v. Aguirre, (Ariz.
1945) 161 P. (2d) 117.
193a In the case of duress, as in other situations where restitution is sought, the
defenses of bona fide purchase and change of circumstances are available. Bumgardner v.
Corey, 124 W. Va. 373, 21 S.E •. (2d) 360 (1942).
194
315 U.S. 289, 62 S. Ct. 581 (1942).
196
Justice Douglas also dissented, on the ground that the disputed bonus provision was separable from the rest of the contract and constituted an unenforceable gift
of public funds.
It is clear that had the court considered this a case of duress, restitution would
have been allowed.
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cost-plus-fixed-fee agreements which also contained a "bonus-for-savings" clause. To accelerate production and to avoid the administrative
responsibilities incident to commandeering the plarit, the government
finally acquiesced in this demand. There was a difference between estimated costs anc;l those which actually resulted of approximately
$26,000,000. Under the terms of the contracts, Bethlehem would
have received in fixed fees plus bonus payments more than $24,000,000, representing a total profit of approximately 22 per cent on
their actual cost. As is pointed out in the article just quoted,196 there
is much to b~ said in favor of the view expressed by Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion.197
In Smelo v. Girard Trust Company 198 defendant, who had contracted to sell land to plaintiff, subsequently refused to convey the·
property unless plaintiff would pay an additional sum of $ 1500 as
penalties and interest on delinquent taxes, under threat to cancel their
agreement. To avoi<l; a forfeiture of the $3000 which plaintiff had
paid on the contract, he paid defendant the extra $1500 under protest
and brought action of assumpsit to recover such amount. The court
held for plaintiff, saying: "He was forced to pay the additional
·amount demanded to protect that interest and to secure a deed for the
premises, without recourse to legal proceedings. Time was important
to him, for his commitments contemplated the beginning of building
construction in the Spring of 1942. Clearly the payment was made
under duress . . . ." 199 Similarly, in Airline Motor Coaches, Inc. v.
Parks,2° 0 to an action under the death statute the defendant interposed
a release executed by the widow of the deceased, a woman of little education or mental attainments who was suffering from grief and shock .
brought on by the sudden death of her husband. She entered into the
agreement of settlement and release at a funeral home where her husband's body was lying, awaiting burial, and a portion of the $500 received was in the form of a check in favor of the undertakers. The
court, although reversing the plaintiff's judgment on other grounds,
upheld a ruling setting aside the release, pointing out that whereas "the
representative and attorney representing the bus company in these
196

See supra, note 193. · '
The case has been written up so thoroughly that no more than this resume
need be made here. Among the numerous discussions of the case the following are
notable: 51 YALE L. J. 855 (1942); Hale, "Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty," 43 CoL. L. REv. 603 at 621 et seq. (1943).
198
158 Pa. Super. 473, 45 A. (2d) 264 (1946).
199 Id. at- 476.
.
200
(';I'ex. 1945) _190 S.E. (2d) 142.
197
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negotiations apparently acted in good faith and discussed the terms and
. effect of the settlement with her as fully as could have been expected
of anyone, Mrs. Parks could not be deemed to be in such mental condition as to make her completely responsible for and bound by her acts
at that time and under such circumstances. If the appellant were liable
to her for the death of her husband the sum paid in consideration for
the releases was inadequate." 201
,
Somewhat similar is Carroll v. Fetty 202 were the grief-stricken
parents of a young child, killed by an autom,obile driven by the defendant, signed a release in .consideration of a payment of $800, because they had no money to pay the undertaker who had refused to
give up the child's pody for burial until his charges were paid or secured. The court, two judges dissenting, held that this release was no
bar to an action under the death statute.
That, as Justice Frankfurter contended in the Bethlehem Steel
Company case, "necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men" 208
is emphasized in LaFayette Dramatic Productions, Inc. v. Ferentz 204
where about two hours before plaintiff's theater was to open, it manager was forced to sign a contract employing musicians whom he did not
need or require, under a threat of a strike by his employees, members
of defendant stage hands' union, with whom he had no direct dispute,
which strike would make it impossible for him to open or operate the
theatre.
D. Compulsion of legal proceedings
A threat of instituting a criminal prosecution of the one threatenea
or of a near relative may be, and often is, true duress, and if so, restitufion of money or property transferred because of such duress Cq,n be
had, except where the defense that the plaintiff was in pari-d~licto is
available to the defendant. 205 Benefits conferred under threat of a civil
action do not ordinarily entitle the transferor to restitution, since such
201
:l!O:I!

Id. at 145.
121 W. Va. 215, 2 S.E. (2d) 521 (1939), noted, 46 W. VA. L. Q. 91

(1939).
208

The quotation is from Lord Northington's opinion in Vernon v. Bethel, 2
Eden II0 at II3, 28 Eng. Rep. 838 (1762).
204
305 Mich. 193, 9 N.W. (2d) 57 (1943), 145 A.L.R. 1158 at 1171 (1943).
See also Millsap v. National Funding Corp., 57 Cal. App. (2d) 772, 135 P. (2d) 407
(1943). (Plaintiff induced under threat of discharge to assign to an Employee's Association fees to which she was entitled.) This is said to be .the first instance in which
the government has claimed to be the victim of duress practiced by an individual or
private corporation.
.
205
See 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,§§ 1612-1616 (1937). See also 135
A. L. R. 728 (1941).
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conduct is a lawful form of compulsion,206 but a threat of bringing a
civil action when made for the purpose of coercion and in bad faith, i.e.,·
with knowledge that no cause of action exists, is duress, and restitution
may be had. 201
Where benefits have been conferred in satisfaction of a judgment,
upon reversal of such judgment restitution is normally allowed. 208
Howev:er, the right to restitution is not an absolute one; but is equitable
in nature, and therefore will be refused where to grant it would produce an inequitable result. 209 In Lytle v. Payette-Oregon Slope Irrigation District 210 a judgment creditor bought in the debtor's land at the
execution sale thereof and while in possession committed waste by permitting the land to become infested with noxious weeds. Upon reversal
of the judgment it was held that the debtor was entitled to recover, not
only possession of the premises and the value of its use while in the
creditor's possession, but also damages for diminution in the market
value of the property caused by the waste. 211
206
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. American Soc. of Comp., Authors
and Pub., (Neb. 1945) 19 N.W. (2d) 540.
·
201
Bumgardner v. Corey, 124 W. Va. 373, 21 S.E. (2d} 360 (1942); Electrical Research Products v. Gross, (C.C.A. 9th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 301.
208
Kilmer v. Kilmer, 249 Wis. 41, 23 N.W. (2d) 510 (1946) (upon vacation
by a wife of a judgment of absolute divorce she is under a duty to restore any benefits received pursuant to the judgment of divorce, citing RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,
§ 74 (1937); People's Building & Loan Assn. v. Wagner, 297 Ky. 558, 180 S.W. (2d}
295 ( 1944), judgment of foreclosure of mortgage set aside as void, therefore, innocent
transferee .of mortgagee buying in at foreclosure sale not protected. RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,§ 74, commentj (1937). See 7 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 382 (1940).
209
Bank of America Natl. Trust & Savings Assn. v. McLaughlin, 37 Cal. App.
(2d) 4.15, 99 P. (2d) 548 (1940), an unlawful detainer action for leased premises.
Pursuant to the lease, defendant had deposited in a warehouse part of the crop grown
on the leased premises, and, pursuant to judgment in its favor below, plaintiff levied
execution on the deposit, proceeds of-which were paid to plaintiff. Upon reversal of
judgment, held that since defendant's right to reversal was predicated upon the exis.tence of the lease and defendant's compliance with the terms thereof by storing the
crop in the warehouse in payment of the rental, restitution was properly denieq. Citing RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 74, comment c. (1937).
210
175 Ore. 276, 152 P. (2d} 934 (1944); 156 A.L.R. 894 at 905 (1945),
collecting authorities.
211
Citi~g RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 74, comment f (1937).

,,.

